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ESSAY
OF PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
Abraham Bell * and Gideon Parchomovsky**
The property–information interface is perhaps the most crucial
and undertheorized dimension of property law. Information about property can make or break property rights. Information about assets and
property rights can dramatically enhance the value of ownership. Conversely, a dearth of information can signiﬁcantly reduce the beneﬁts
associated with ownership. It is surprising, therefore, that contemporary
property theorists do not engage in sustained analysis of the property–
information interface and, in particular, of registries—the repositories
of information about property.
Once, things were different. In the past, discussions of registries
used to be a core topic in property classes and a focal point for property
scholarship. In recent decades, registries have lost their luster for scholars, and their discussion has been relegated to the innermost pages of
property textbooks. The reason for this is that registries are widely
considered the domain of legal practitioners, not of theorists.
This Essay argues that nothing could be further from the truth.
Registries and the information they contain are, in fact, the formative
forces that shape the world of property and no theoretical account of the
institution of property can be complete without them. In this Essay, we
offer the ﬁrst in-depth legal-theoretical analysis of the intricate relation*. Professor, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law and University of San Diego School
of Law.
**. Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law;
Professor, Bar-Ilan University Faculty of Law. Earlier versions of this Essay were presented
at the annual conferences of the American Law and Economics Association and the
International Society for New Institutional Economics, and at conferences and faculty
workshops at the law schools of Emory University, the University of Pennsylvania, the
University of San Diego, and Tulane University. The Essay greatly beneﬁted from comments and criticisms by participants in those fora, as well as from Benito Arruñada, Adi
Ayal, Ian Ayres, Tom Baker, Shyam Balganesh, Oren Bar-Gill, Michael Baris, Jordan Barry,
Miriam Bitton, Victor Bouganim, Michael Broyde, Bill Buzbee, Yun-chien Chang, Matt
Corriel, Bill Draper, Don Dripps, Yuval Feldman, Lee Fennell, Jill Fisch, Vic Fleischer, Dov
Fox, Eric Freyfogle, Israel Gilad, Aviad Hacohen, Adam Hirsch, Sharona Hoffman, Mike
Kelly, Jon Klick, Marjorie Kornhauser, Seth Kreimer, Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Bill Lawrence,
Bert Lazerow, Kay Levine, Ronit Levine-Schnur, Glynn Lunney, Paul McMahon, Jonathan
Nash, Jide Nzelibe, Shu-Yi Oei, Michael Pappas, Shitong Qiao, Lisa Ramsey, Ed Rock, Erik
Røsæg, Ted Ruger, Chaim Saiman, Robert Schapiro, Ted Sichelman, Peter Siegelman,
Henry Smith, Mila Sohoni, Horacio Spector, Alex Stein, Michal Tamir, Chagai Vinizky,
Sasha Volokh, Christopher Yoo, Michael Wachter, Phil Weiser, Tobias Wolff, and Chris
Wonnell; and from outstanding research assistance provided by Ananth Padmanabhan.
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ship among title information, rights, and assets in the domain of property, as mediated by registries.
Our analysis gives rise to several new insights. First, we highlight
the triple role that registries perform for property owners. They simultaneously perform a facilitative role by streamlining transactions between willing sellers and buyers, an obstructive role by hindering nonconsensual encroachments and takings of assets, and an enabling role
by allowing owners to locate and use their own lost assets. Second,
going against the accepted lore, we posit that perfect registries, even if
they were possible, are socially undesirable on account of what we call
“the information–asset paradox.” Perfect information about assets and
legal rights may result in the destruction, dismembering, and mutilation of the asset by nonconsensual takers in an attempt to make the
asset unrecognizable, as exempliﬁed by millions of stolen cars and jewelry, or, conversely, in attempts of “identity theft” that confer thieves with
the beneﬁt of the registered rights. Third, we argue that the registries are
socially desirable when it is impossible or difficult to alter the deﬁning
characteristic of the underlying asset. This insight explains why there
are registries for nontransformable assets, such as land and unique artworks, but not for transformable assets that include mass production
goods and many natural resources. Finally, we address the question of
which rights should be covered by registries and how much legal deference should be given to them.
The framework we provide is signiﬁcant not only for theoretical
reasons but also for practical ones. For example, it can inform policymakers in deciding whether to establish new registries for smartphones
and personal computers in order to combat theft of such devices. Similarly, our analysis sounds a cautionary note about the ability of registries of copyrighted works to curb unlawful appropriation and distribution. Per our analysis, such assets are inﬁnitely malleable and, worse
yet, information concerning ownership in such works can be easily
effaced or altered in the digital age. We also discuss how considerations
of costs and privacy affect the comprehensiveness and integrity of registries. At the end of the day, our analysis exposes the promise and the
limitations of registries, as well as the ways in which they can be
improved by the state.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 239
I. TRANSACTIONS AND INFORMATION ABOUT PROPERTY ........................... 244
A. The Facilitating Function of Property Registration ................... 247
B. The Obstructive and Enabling Functions of Registering
Information About Property....................................................... 255
1. The Obstructive Function ....................................................... 256
2. The Enabling Function ........................................................... 259
C. Measuring the Informational Value of Property Registration .. 260
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INTRODUCTION
Very few concepts affect our property system as profoundly as
information about property rights.1 In this Essay, we argue that extant
theorizing on the property–information interface, while illuminating and
important, misses essential aspects of the intricate and dynamic relationship between property and information. The Essay seeks to address this
omission and offer a deeper understanding of how information shapes
rights and assets in the property domain.
To date, legal scholarship on the property–information interface has
primarily focused on three questions. First, most theorists who have
investigated the interface between information and property rights have
focused their attention on property rights in information itself. This is
best evidenced by the vast and ever-growing literature on intellectual
property (IP) law.2 Secondarily, in the context of standard property law,
1. See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev.
465, 468 (2004) [hereinafter Long, Information Costs] (emphasizing signiﬁcance of making observers aware of property rights held by others so they may effectively comply with
responsibilities saddled on them by creation of right in question); Meredith M. Render,
Complexity in Property, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 79, 96–118 (2013) (providing comprehensive
overview of information-costs thesis propounded by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith and
important critiques offered in counter).
2. See, e.g., David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The
America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 517 (2013) (leveraging
empirical model to predict impact of America Invents Act on proportion of patents secured by individual investors); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets,
113 Colum. L. Rev. 2277 (2013) (advocating independent market for copyright claims and
outlining potential beneﬁts of permitting third-party involvement in copyright infringement claims); Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation–Construction
Distinction in Patent Law, 123 Yale L.J. 530 (2013) (distinguishing between sources of
uncertainty in patent claim construction); Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum
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scholars—most notably Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith,3 as well as
Clarisa Long4—have examined how the internal design of property
doctrines and principles convey information to the public at large.
Finally, and relatedly, some scholars have concentrated on the way various doctrines, such as those related to adverse possession, encourage or
demand that claimants reveal information.5
None of these bodies of literature address the special role of
information about title in property. In this Essay, we analyze the value of
of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 Yale L.J. 1900 (2013) (positing excludability
in patent rights is asymmetrical for different kinds of information and suggesting alternative approaches to property protection are necessary); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inﬂation,
121 Yale L.J. 470 (2011) (arguing institutional relationship between Patent Trademark
Office and Federal Circuit leads to inﬂationary pressure on patents); Dotan Oliar, The
Copyright–Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Intentional Inﬂiction
of Harm, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 951 (2012) (investigating potential for property rules and
liability rules to minimize interference between copyright owners and maximize innovators’ incentive to invest); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property
Defenses, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1483 (2013) (suggesting ways to expand binding precedential value of individual patent claims and prevent superﬂuous litigation from
imposing societal costs); Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 761
(2013) (suggesting new theoretical framework for evaluating trademark system centered
on moral obligations between consumers and producers); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond
Coase: Emerging Technologies and Property Theory, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2189 (2012)
(examining interdependencies characterizing new technologies and resulting implications
for choice of property form); Xiyin Tang, Note, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark
Conception of Moral Rights, 122 Yale L.J. 218 (2012) (arguing artists’ “moral rights”
beneﬁt public by lowering search costs and increasing efficiency in art markets).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 40–42 (2000) [hereinafter
Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization] (identifying minimization of information costs
as key rationale guiding numerus clausus principle, and advocating resort to legislature,
rather than judiciary, as appropriate institutional forum for modifying closed list of
recognized property interests); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 795–96, 801–02 (2001) (arguing in
rem character of property rights renders rules governing them more rigid due to need to
furnish information to wider pool of individuals); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property
Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1753–54 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property Rules]
(suggesting property rules enjoy advantage over liability rules insofar as they allow
decentralization of decisionmaking and concomitant reduction of information costs).
4. Long, Information Costs, supra note 1, at 480–82 (observing in intellectual
property context that “[l]egal rules must balance the goal of reduction of information
costs with other social values” and that best rules “will not always be the ones that make
transmission of information about the good easy”); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 625, 667–71 (2002) (presenting model of patents as signaling mechanism used
for conveying information).
5. William C. Marra, Adverse Possession, Takings, and the State, 89 U. Det. Mercy L.
Rev. 1, 14–15 (2011) (arguing deterrence of rent-seeking, by compelling record owner to
come forward, disclose information, and stake her claim within statute of limitations, is
one of the more powerful justiﬁcations for adverse possession); Thomas J. Miceli & C.F.
Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 161, 164
(1995) (describing how time-limited property rules create incentives to uncover and share
information ex ante).
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this information and the means of efficiently producing and disseminating it. Our analysis is based on the simple idea that the value of title
to property rights vitally depends on the degree to which it is known by
people in the world, including the property owner.
Knowledge about title to property rights is crucial to enjoying their
value. If one “owned” an asset, but nobody knew about the ownership, its
value would be deeply compromised. Buyers would not readily appear, as
they would not have any information to conﬁrm the title of the seller.
Third parties might use the asset and even destroy it, believing in good
faith that it belonged to no one. Owners would sharply constrain uses of
their asset in order to avoid actions that might be interpreted as compromising their title, and they would expend greater resources on protecting
their ownership. An owner without knowledge of title would fail to
exploit the value of the asset. In short, the value of property rights is
directly affected by the quality of information about title to those rights.
The world of property provides many examples of the value of
information about property title. Consider, for instance, the sad case of
insurance monies and bank assets belonging to victims of the Holocaust.
While the Nazis looted much of the property of their victims, many
assets, such as bank accounts in Switzerland, remained out of Nazi
Germany’s reach. By murdering the owners of the accounts together with
most of their families, the Nazis left the assets—worth hundreds of billions of dollars—in the hands of Swiss banks, while the true owners of the
assets (the heirs of those murdered by the Nazis) had no knowledge of
their property rights. Knowledge of title to the assets in this case was
worth hundreds of billions of dollars.6 A more prosaic set of examples
can be found in the television program “Heir Hunters,” broadcast by the
British network BBC, focusing on probate detectives and their attempts
to locate owners who are unaware that they have inherited assets and
money.7
Just as the lack of good title information about property can hinder
owners’ use and enjoyment, the opposite is also true: Full information
about ownership in assets can help increase value for owners by discouraging nonconsensual takings of the assets. Indeed, this is the reason
for the rise of registries for rights in movable goods, such as cars and
6. Legal resolution of the claims ultimately involved a number of legal and political
questions beyond the mere question of knowledge of title. For a review of the litigation
and its settlement, see In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141–43
(E.D.N.Y. 2000); Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (Swiss Banks), http://www.swissbank
claims.com/Overview.aspx [http://perma.cc/Y8XG-YR6Q] (last updated Sept. 22, 2015).
7. See Heir Hunters, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007nms5 [http://
perma.cc/MD82-CUTK] (last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (advertising “[s]eries following the
work of heir hunters, probate detectives looking for distant relatives of people who have
died without making a will”). Many other examples can be found in the world of
intellectual property and, in particular, what are known as “orphan copyrights.” See infra
note 99 and accompanying text (examining prevalence of “orphaned” copyright works).
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boats. To give a recent example, many universities have established title
registries in bicycles to battle the epidemic of bicycle theft on campuses.8
This policy is predicated on the belief that information about assets creates as important a deterrent against theft as locks, chains, and security
cameras.
This Essay constitutes the ﬁrst attempt to illuminate the symbiotic
relationships between information and property. It seeks to make three
contributions to our understanding of how information and property
interact, each of which targets a separate dimension of the interplay
between the two. First, we analyze the “obstructive” and “enabling”
functions of information about title to property. Extant theorizing has
focused primarily on what we call the “facilitating function” of information about property. The facilitating function refers to the role of
information in streamlining consensual transactions between rights
holders and legitimate purchasers by lowering transaction costs. Following observations ﬁrst made by Steven Shavell,9 we demonstrate that information about property rights performs several key functions (and not
one as was previously emphasized) in our property system: a facilitating
function, an obstructive function, and an enabling function. The obstructive function refers to the ability of information to block, or at least
hinder, nonconsensual appropriations of property by illicit parties, such
as thieves and defrauders. The enabling function, by contrast, refers to
the way title information in the hands of the owners is necessary for them
to enjoy the beneﬁts of property ownership. Interestingly, we show that
the three functions can be contradictory or complementary, depending
on the informational environment.
Second and equally importantly, we unveil the potential tension
between title information and the safety of an asset, which we dub “the
information–asset paradox.” At ﬁrst blush, it seems clear that society
would be best off with an informational regime that offers perfect information about title to property rights in assets. Upon closer examination
it becomes clear that is not the case. As we show, in a world with perfect
information about rights to assets, nonconsensual takers would resort to
altering physically or even destroying others’ assets. Such activities may
include disassembling automobiles, machinery, and electronic goods,
and transforming jewelry into scrap metals.10 Alternatively, where property information is collected in a particular location as part of a centralized registry, but the information is vulnerable, nonconsensual takers
may attempt to take control of the information and thereby make it
easier for the property to fall into unsavory hands. The crime of “identity
theft” is based on just such a practice. By appropriating the owner’s
8. See infra section I.C (examining effectiveness of bicycle registries in combating
theft).
9. Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 46–52 (2004).
10. See infra section II.A (surveying strategies of nonconsensual takers).
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“identity,” the thief is able to take possession of all the assets registered in
the owner’s name.11
All such activities are value reducing not only for the owner but also
for society as a whole. Counterintuitively, society is often better off when
the encroacher misappropriates the owner’s asset instead of destroying it.
Perfect information about assets will, therefore, not always be in society’s
best interest.
Third, we highlight the dynamic nature of property and information
about property. Assets, property rights, and title information can be
changed, and there are three different categories of actors who can bring
about these changes. Property owners (and their potential consensual
transferees), nonconsensual takers, and the government all constantly
struggle over the information–asset interplay. Each group’s actions can
dramatically affect the informational environment that surrounds property rights. Adopting a dynamic perspective, we identify the previously
hidden strategies that animate actions in the world of property in response to the informational background. Speciﬁcally, we show that when
information about ownership may be easily manipulated, registries produce little value for owners. This can best be seen in the copyright realm.
In the digital world, information about rights may be easily effaced, altered, and manipulated. As a result, copyright owners face a near impossible
task controlling their intellectual assets online.12
Just as importantly, we show that the incentives of the actors are not
uniform; they may change over time. To point to just one outstanding
example, consider the incentives of an owner who ﬁnds herself in debt
and possibly subject to enforcement actions by creditors.13 Whereas the
owner might earlier have sought good title information in order to protect her ownership interests in assets, the owner might now seek to hide
assets from creditors and might therefore seek to obscure or destroy title
information. As owners move closer to insolvency, or as they are more
likely to lose their assets to creditors, their incentives move closer to
those of nonconsensual takers, while creditors’ incentives move closer to
those of solvent owners.
An important policy implication of our analysis that departs from
prior theorizing is that, despite the high value of registries, for many
categories of assets, it does not make sense to establish registries. We
demonstrate that the key to the successful operation of registries lies not
in the information per se, but rather in the ﬁt between the information

11. See infra notes 123–124 and accompanying text (discussing this nonconsensual
taker strategy).
12. See infra section III.B.1 (considering opportunities for effacement of ownership
information in copyright context).
13. See infra section II.C (examining debtor incentives to conceal title information
from creditors).
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and the asset as it exists in the real world.14 In general, registries are most
valuable when there is conﬁdence that the asset as it exists in the real
world will continue to match the description in the registry. This is
because assets may be physically vulnerable even when ownership information is protected in registries. The easier it is to undermine the ﬁt
between asset and information by changing the information or the asset,
the less valuable the registry will be. For example, when it is possible to
reconﬁgure the asset without signiﬁcant loss in value, as in the case with
mass-produced jewelry, a title registry will be of only limited value to
owners.15
Additionally, it will rarely be socially desirable to make the
information in registries comprehensive. This is because the value of
accurate information in facilitating transactions and obstructing involuntary takings must be balanced against the costs of obtaining and maintaining accurate information. The state must also act cautiously before
investing registries with the ﬁnal say in establishing title. Where the information in registries establishes ownership despite any potential ﬂaws in
the title, the registries potentially make it easier for involuntary takers to
“launder” their takings.
Structurally, the Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we explore
extant theorizing of the property-information interface. In Part II, we
offer our account of the relationship between property and information
by engaging in a dynamic analysis of the two institutions that pays heed
to the intricate subtleties generated by the interplay between them. In
Part III, we discuss the informational policies lawmakers should adopt in
order to improve the workings of our property system. A short conclusion
ensues.
I. TRANSACTIONS AND INFORMATION ABOUT PROPERTY
Information about title to property is vital to the functioning of a
legal system of property, but, to date, it has drawn distressingly little
scholarly attention. This is surprising, in particular, given the welldeveloped scholarly literature on a closely related question: how the
internal design of property doctrines and principles conveys ownership
information.
The main contributors to this latter literature are Professors Merrill
and Smith. In their joint work, they advance an information-based
justiﬁcation for the closed enumeration rule (numerus clausus), which
limits the types of property rights (such as fee simple, tenancy in com-

14. See infra section III.B (emphasizing registries’ role in optimizing alignment
between asset and identifying information).
15. See infra section II.A (noting value of registries is reduced when thieves can
proﬁtably reconﬁgure asset).
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mon, etc.) to those already established by law.16 Professors Merrill and
Smith explain that since property rights bind third parties, it is desirable
to limit the number of recognized rights so that third parties will not
have to expend excessive efforts on educating themselves about the
content and nature of property rights.17 Accordingly, Professors Merrill
and Smith argue, the task of recognizing new rights is entrusted to the
state alone.18 Elaborating on the same theme, Professor Smith, in a series
of individually authored articles, draws on insights from the economics of
information to expound the informational effects of such property doctrines as possession in order to explain how their doctrinal designs communicate information to third parties.19
Our aim is very different. We do not seek to explain how and why
the law deﬁnes what property rights are. Rather, we ask how and why the
state conveys information about title in those rights. The most common
means of conveying information about property rights is a property registry, which lists different property rights and their owners. The extant literature on registries has primarily focused on one narrow aspect of the
interplay of asset and information: Registries convey information cheaply
and thereby lower transaction costs between sellers and buyers of property.20 The information in registries allows consensual buyers to identify
the sellers with whom they wish to transact, as well as to ascertain the
precise nature and scope of the sellers’ rights. At a risk of a mild overgeneralization, it can be said that existing scholarship focuses on the
effect of registries on the owner’s ability to transfer property. The scholarship highlights what we call the “facilitating function” of registries in
easing transfers.
In this Part, we show that registries offer two virtues that have drawn
far less attention. First, registrations enable owners to recognize their
ability to use assets. This is most obvious in cases like the Nazi-seized
16. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 3, at 69 (“Permitting free
customization of new forms of property would impose signiﬁcant external costs on third
parties . . . .”). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and
Federalism, 115 Yale L.J. 72, 80 (2005) (advocating “ﬂexible version of the numerus clausus
principle, [which] allows owners to go beyond the menu of property forms offered in their
jurisdiction and to import forms from other states that better ﬁt their needs”).
17. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 3, at 27–29 (classifying
individuals affected by property relations into three categories and arguing third class of
“other market participants,” i.e. those outside “zone of privity,” are ones most affected by
failure of information about holding in question).
18. Id. at 58–60 (contending courts are inhospitable forum to enlarge closed list of
property interests and positing function is best discharged by legislature).
19. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L.
Rev. 965 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742 (2007); Henry E. Smith, The Language of
Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105 (2003); Smith, Property
Rules, supra note 3; Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691
(2012).
20. See infra section I.A (surveying existing literature on registries).
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assets, where the true owners were unaware of their ownership interests
in the assets.21 Registries, in such situations, allow owners to discover
their legal interest and start using their property. In other words, registrations can also be said to fulﬁll an “enabling” function.
Second, registrations strengthen owners’ powers of exclusion by
playing a critical role in deterring involuntary takings or uses of assets. In
our terminology, the registries bear an “obstructive function” alongside
their facilitating function. Information about assets thus affects a larger
audience than merely consensual buyers and sellers. The information
affects nonconsensual takers who seek to deprive property holders of
their entitlements by deploying a range of illicit strategies, ranging from
forceful takings to fraud. As information about the true state of title of an
asset spreads, the ability of nonconsensual takers to seize control of and
proﬁtably use the asset shrinks. Nonconsensual takers must curb public
uses of the assets where their lack of title might be revealed. Additionally,
nonconsensual takers will encounter greater difficulties in transferring
possession of the assets.22 Many nonconsensual takers do not intend to
use the taken assets themselves; rather, they seek to sell them to third
parties and thereby integrate them into the stream of commerce. A thief
who operates on a college campus obviously does not need more than
one bicycle, laptop, or smartphone for self-use; all the other items are
stolen to be sold to third parties. Better information about licit rights
obstructs the transfer of property by thieves, deters the thieves’ potential
customers, and thereby helps secure value in the property rights for the
licit owner.
Information in registries, therefore, plays a role in two distinct kinds
of transfers: It facilitates voluntary licit transfers, while simultaneously
obstructing involuntary or illicit transfers. Information about property in
registries is a valuable safety device that works to the advantage of property owners. It allows them to use their assets more freely and extensively
and hence derive more value from them. In this capacity, registries
strengthen not just owners’ rights to transfer but also their right to
exclude, which is considered by many property scholars to be the key
property incident.23

21. See Morris A. Ratner, The Settlement of Nazi-Era Litigation Through the
Executive and Judicial Branches, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 212, 212–24 (2002) (chronicling
travails of litigants and litigation course that led to successful outcome after several years
of struggle for recognition of victims’ claims).
22. See Shavell, supra note 9, at 47–48 (noting registration systems discourage theft
because “value of stolen property to a thief is . . . diminished by the chance that it will be
discovered and taken away and that he will be punished”).
23. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730,
731 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of
identifying the existence of property.”).
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In this Part, we explore the function of property registries in facilitating licit transactions and obstructing illicit transactions. We begin by
examining previous analyses of property registration.
A.

The Facilitating Function of Property Registration

For the most part, existing literature on registries of property information may be divided into two major categories: the economic literature and the legal literature. The economic literature focuses on the
formalization of property rights. It is characterized by a high level of
abstraction, but it is not terribly interested in legal niceties. Consequently, it often disregards legal distinctions that we will show are critical.
The legal literature is curiously out of date—a great deal was written
about land registration systems in the 1930s, but recent years have seen
few contributions.
The main contributors to the economic literature include Hernando
de Soto, Dean Lueck, Gary Libecap, and Benito Arruñada.24 They discuss
registration primarily in the broader context of “titling,” often conﬂating
the two. Registration and titling, however, are distinct phenomena. Registration means recording property rights in a fashion that disseminates
information about them more widely. Titling, by contrast, is concerned
with the legal validity of claimed property rights. Titling projects attempt
to grant legal title to assets that are already functionally (though perhaps
illicitly) “owned” by claimants.25
For example, in his seminal work on informal property rights in
Latin America,26 Professor de Soto discusses de facto property rights,
such as those that exist in favelas in Brazil and urban areas in Peru, where
squatters possess large swaths of land. While the squatters have no legal
title to the lands, they operate under a network of informal property
rights that bind the dwellers inter se and are not recognized by the
state.27 Addressing the welfare loss resulting from the existence of such
de facto rights, Professor de Soto points to the importance of formal

24. We discuss Steven Shavell’s important contributions separately in section I.B,
infra.
25. We wish to make this conceptual distinction for the sake of clarity. However, cf.
Anne-Marie Leroy & Jonathan Lindsay, Agricultural Investment and Land: Some
Reﬂections on Lessons Learned (and Still to Be Learned) from Experiences with Land
Titling, 17 Uniform L. Rev. 15, 18–19 (2012) (highlighting different senses in which the
term “titling” is commonly used and how variants run entire gamut from creating or
conferring new or heightened legal protection to merely acknowledging existence of
“well-established” proprietary rights).
26. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West
and Fails Everywhere Else (2000).
27. Id. at 88–95 (detailing myriad ways in which extralegal property arrangements
mark their presence in developing world).
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state recognition of property rights.28 Professor de Soto argues that the
absence of state recognition and registration of these property rights
greatly diminishes their value (and therefore further impoverishes the
squatters).29 For example, Professor de Soto notes that favela dwellers
cannot use equity in their de facto realty holdings as security for loans,
and therefore cannot use them to support the creation of businesses.30
Because the informal property lacks the panoply of protections that
come with state recognition, it cannot be mortgaged, pledged, or levied
upon.31 Professor de Soto’s proposed solution is a massive titling effort
that would bring those rights into the formal property system.32 His
proposal pays relatively little attention to the legal details of such an
effort.
In legal parlance, Professor de Soto’s work concentrates on the issue
of titling.33 That is, Professor de Soto is primarily interested in the state
assigning legal title. Our Essay, by contrast, focuses not on the question of
who should get legal title but how to treat information about the already
existing title. The beneﬁts anticipated by Professor de Soto naturally
require both titling and registering. Few banks would agree to lend
money on the security of a mortgage were the title unregistered, even if
the title were legally cognizable. Nonetheless, Professor de Soto’s work
conﬂates the questions, treating the process of titling as necessarily entailing recording as well.34

28. Id. at 47–62 (identifying six important ways legal recognition of proprietary
interests can beneﬁt economy). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property
Lost in Translation, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 515, 570–72 (2013) (citing Professor de Soto’s work
and cautioning mere recordation of property interests may not necessarily work when
localized property norms are at variance with state-imposed regulatory framework).
29. De Soto, supra note 26, at 29 (pointing out how many real estate holdings are
extralegal from beginning or fall out of law’s ambit due to mounting compliance costs,
resulting in many potential assets not being identiﬁed or realized).
30. Id. at 85–86 (declaring this to be state of legal apartheid).
31. Cf. id. at 56 (discussing ability of Western formal property systems to protect and
track property through public recordkeeping and thereby enable utilization of assets as
capital).
32. See id. at 39–40, 45–46, 49–51 (“What the poor lack is easy access to the [formal]
property mechanisms that could legally ﬁx the economic potential of their assets so that
they could be used to produce, secure or guarantee greater value in the expanded
market.”).
33. See Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the
Potential to Deepen Democracy, 50 St. Louis U. L.J. 761, 761 (2006) (deﬁning “land
titling” as phenomenon where governments give individuals ownership to land they
occupy).
34. One reason that the phenomena of titling and registration are often conﬂated is
that doctrines like adverse possession that award title to certain kinds of nonconsensual
possessors can be used both to update defective registrations and to reallocate title to
presumably better owners. A project that records titles of squatters—one of the central
themes of Professor de Soto, supra note 26—thus simultaneously reallocates title and
registers it.
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Another representative example of the economic literature can be
found in a series of recent articles by Professors Libecap and Lueck.35
The articles stem from a large empirical study of land demarcation.36
Professors Libecap and Lueck examine patterns of demarcation—essentially, the division of land into individual lots. In particular, they compare
two demarcation systems that predominate in the United States: the
rectangular system and the metes and bounds system.37 Under the metesand-bounds system, which is common to ﬁfteen states, the boundaries of
land parcels are marked by reference to landmarks or topographic features.38 For example, a parcel may be recorded as extending from the
riverbed on the south and the west to the peach tree orchard on the
north and the brick wall on the east. The rectangular system, by contrast,
relies on a grid formation comprised of uniform square lots, each of
which is designated by a unique sector address.39 A lot might be known as
unit 115/93, where 115 and 93 are x- and y-coordinates on a map of a
large area. Professors Libecap and Lueck’s main ﬁnding is that the
rectangular system is generally associated with higher land values.40
While Professors Libecap and Lueck’s work demonstrates the value
of good information about property, it treats a very special case: where
the information about the property is conveyed by the shape of the asset
itself. Thus, although the focal point of their work is historical asset conﬁguration—that is, how the land was physically divided into smaller parcels—Professors Libecap and Lueck’s analysis contains only a veiled
reference to land registries. In listing the advantages of the rectangular
system, Professors Libecap and Lueck note the informational beneﬁts of
this system. Speciﬁcally, they assert that the rectangular system prevents
strategic land grabs among neighbors by establishing clear information
about parcel borders.41 More generally, they claim that the rectangular
system “reduces potential for overlapping, conﬂicting claims; allows for a
common address system[;] and importantly, lowers transaction costs, pro-

35. See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role
of Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. Pol. Econ. 426, 428 (2011) (arguing rectangular system lowers costs incurred in enforcement of property rights, trading of
property, and coordination for purposes of infrastructure investment, but at cost of
inﬂexibility during demarcation of land boundaries).
36. See id. at 436–59.
37. Id. at 427.
38. See id. (“[The metes and bounds system] is decentralized, whereby each individual deﬁnes parcels independently and idiosyncratically [through reference to] nonstandard, impermanent [markers, such as trees, structures, and adjacent properties].”).
39. Id. at 427–28.
40. Id. at 428–29.
41. See id. at 453 (demonstrating rates of boundary disputes, entry disputes, and
survey disputes were far higher when metes and bounds system used than with rectangular
system).
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moting land markets.”42 Like Professor de Soto, Professors Libecap and
Lueck conﬂate titling and registration questions and pay little heed to
the legal machinery that accompanies the land demarcation. They do
not discuss recordation systems, or even the legal implications of the difference between registration and recordation.43 Simply put, they do not
distinguish between the form in which the law recognizes property rights
and the form in which the state records them. Hence, the utility of their
study for legal theorists is limited.
More generally, multiple economic theorists have championed what
has come to be called, in economic parlance, an institutional approach
to property. Both utilizing44 and departing45 from insights gleaned from
the writings of Ronald Coase, institutional economic contributions proceed from the assumption that as long as transaction costs are sufficiently
low, markets can be relied on to achieve an efficient allocation of resources.46 On this vision, assets—or more precisely the legal rights to
assets—gravitate through a series of voluntary transfers to their highestvalue user. The initial allocation of resources is of limited importance
since the market can “correct” misallocations. The important thing
about the initial allocation is that it must clearly deﬁne the underlying
assets and rights in them.47 In other words, the initial allocation must
satisfy certain informational minima necessary for the operation of markets.48 The gist of this thread in the literature is captured by the following
42. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of
Coordinating Institutions 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14942,
2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1401787 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
43. We discuss the differences between recordation and registration in section III.A,
infra.
44. E.g. Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 11–14 (2d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter Barzel, Economic Analysis] (citing Professor Coase’s focus on contract
formation between value-maximizing individuals as “central to the property rights
approach”); Benito Arruñada, Property as an Economic Concept: Reconciling Legal and
Economic Conceptions of Property Rights in a Coasean Framework, 59 Int’l Rev. Econ.
121, 122–27 (2012) [hereinafter Arruñada, Property as Economic Concept] (applying
Coasean framework to identify conﬂict between in rem property enforcement and
transaction costs, and suggesting maintenance of public registry as viable solution to
address this conﬂict).
45. E.g. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 360 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What
Happened to Property] (critiquing Professor Coase’s contribution to understanding of
property as “cluster of in personam rights” which, according to the authors, hastened
“demise of the in rem conception of property”).
46. Barzel, Economic Analysis, supra note 44, at 51–53 (asserting parties in market
will attempt to adopt contract form that “generates the largest net output value”); Merrill
& Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 45, at 374.
47. Arruñada, Property as Economic Concept, supra note 44, at 121–22.
48. Professor Coase offered this observation himself. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 16 (1960) (“[T]he initial delimitation of legal rights does
have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates.”). As Professor
Arruñada critically writes, this literature adopts “a simplistic view of Coase (1960), to see
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two propositions: (a) information about entitlements lowers transaction
costs; and (b) by lowering transaction costs and streamlining transactions
between willing sellers and willing buyers, information makes entitlements more marketable and thereby increases their value.
Critically, this transactional perspective has grown to predominate
the limited literature on registries. The work of Professor Arruñada is a
case in point.49 Professor Arruñada, arguably the most proliﬁc scholar on
registration and recordation systems, criticizes the work of his fellow
economists—and even his own early work—for remaining “‘ignorant of
property law,’”50 and in particular, for ignoring the in rem nature of
property rights and for failing to distinguish them from contractual, in
personam rights.51 In his work, Professor Arruñada meticulously distinguishes between property rights and contractual rights, but his perspective remains decidedly transactional. As he writes, the survival of property
rights “after conveyance of the asset or any other transformation of rights
requires costly institutions and resources in order to organize the process
of searching, bargaining and contracting for consent.”52 Furthermore,
the main problem on which Professor Arruñada focuses is that of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers and in particular, the risk
of fraudulent transfers by sellers, which may lead to the creation of “hidden property rights.”53 Professor Arruñada explains:
[T]he seller knows better than the acquirer about hidden property rights. More generally, the need of knowing which conﬂictting property rights exist, ﬁnding out who their right holders
are, bargaining with such right holders to obtain their consent
and contracting or somehow formalizing an agreement with
them, all increase the costs of transforming and conveying
rights.54
The same transactional concerns animate Professor Arruñada’s
other research in this area. For example, in another paper, Professor
Arruñada points out the ability of rights registries to reduce transaction
costs that attend rights transfers owing to their ability to reduce the need
for expensive professional services that traditionally accompanied land
property as a mere bundle of use rights and to consider that these are strong if well
deﬁned, if their content is precisely delineated and they are clearly allocated to
individuals.” Arruñada, Property as Economic Concept, supra note 44, at 132.
49. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada, Institutional Foundations of Impersonal Exchange:
Theory and Policy of Contractual Registries 2–3 (2012) (assessing role of registries in
reducing transaction costs of impersonal trade).
50. Arruñada, Property as Economic Concept, supra note 44, at 132 (quoting Dean
Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law § 5.1.1, in 1 Handbook of Law and Economics
183, 187 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007)).
51. Id.
52. Benito Arruñada, Property Titling and Conveyancing, in Research Handbook on
the Economics of Property Law 237, 238 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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transactions.55 Registries, by providing accessible and accurate information about rights in assets, lower search costs for acquirers and
thereby reduce the need for the services of lawyers, public notaries, and
licensed conveyers.56
Surprisingly, a review of the legal literature reveals a paucity of
recent theoretical articles on registration and communication of information about property rights. The most signiﬁcant legal treatment of
registration, which sets the stage for our analysis, can be found in a 1984
article by Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson.57 Professors Baird and
Jackson begin their analysis with the observation that in ancient times,
possession was the legal mechanism by which property owners informed
the public of their rights.58 Transfer of property rights without transfer of
possession was considered a fraudulent transaction, null and void under
the law.59 The emergence of registration dramatically transformed the
ﬁeld of property law. Registration, Professors Baird and Jackson observe,
affords property owners a cost-effective way to notify the public of their
rights, which is critical for the operation of rights in rem.60 The existence
of a central registry, by publicizing property entitlements, affords owners
a much greater degree of freedom with respect to rights transfers.61
Professors Baird and Jackson, two of the most prominent bankruptcy
theorists of our time, illustrate this effect by discussing the ability of
property owners to use their assets as collateral for loans.62 Indeed, since
security interests are rarely possessory, registries can be central to the
functioning of secured debt.63 The more general point, however, is that
registration adds value for owners by allowing them to engage in transfers of rights that they could not otherwise execute.64 This phenomenon
is what we dub the facilitating effect of information about property.
55. Benito Arruñada, Market and Institutional Determinants in the Regulation of
Conveyancers, 23 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 93, 100–01 (2007) (identifying important ways in which
registration system reduces transaction and search costs).
56. See id. at 102–04 (presenting empirical demonstration of registration faring
much better than mere recordal of rights in lowering transaction costs such as fee paid for
conveyancing services). Of course, the initial registration itself is not costless. See infra
section II.B.2 (enumerating various initial costs of registration).
57. Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and
Transfer].
58. Id. at 302–03.
59. Id. at 302.
60. See id. at 304–05 (pointing out land ownership is ideal subject matter for implementation of recording systems).
61. Id. at 305–06.
62. Id. at 307–08.
63. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in
Commercial Finance Law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 421, 425–26 (2005) (explaining role of
registries in perfecting security interests under UCC).
64. Building on this insight, Chagai Vinizky has recently advocated the creation of a
registry for trade secrets. See Chagai Vinizky, Trade Secrets Registry, 35 Pace L. Rev. 455,
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On this basis, Professors Baird and Jackson introduce their core
thesis. They note the existence of a bidirectional relationship between
the applicable legal regime and the informational environment concerning property rights. The legal system can greatly enhance disclosure of
information about property rights by establishing registries and
mandating registration of transfers. This, in turn, can increase the value
of property rights.65 However, since there is a cost to setting up and
maintaining registries, it may not be beneﬁcial to establish registries in all
cases.66 Hence, Professors Baird and Jackson’s main goal is to specify the
conditions under which registries are socially desirable.
Unfortunately, Professors Baird and Jackson do not offer a comprehensive analytical framework that allows us to assess the desirability of
registries in all cases. Instead, they offer a series of discrete observations.
Speciﬁcally, they argue that registries are unlikely to be cost effective
when the rights in the underlying asset are subject to frequent transfers.67
The authors speculate that a high rate of transfers necessitates frequent
updating of the registry and that the cost of doing so may outweigh the
beneﬁts.68 Professors Baird and Jackson also note that registries do not
work cost effectively when it is impossible to identify the underlying asset
with sufficient precision or at a sufficiently low cost. As an example, they
consider the possibility of registering title in a particular grain of wheat.69
More generally, it can be said that high demarcation and identiﬁcation
costs may outweigh the beneﬁts of registries’ information-forcing
effects.70 Finally, Professors Baird and Jackson posit that registries for
personal property would be of limited use when they are geographically
457 (2014) (suggesting trade secrets registry would create value by reducing transaction
and ﬁnancing costs).
65. See Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 301 (arguing
increases in available information about ownership create value by reducing risk for
transacting parties).
66. Id. at 305.
67. Id. at 304, 306.
68. Id. at 306. Here, we feel obliged to remind our reader that Professors Baird and
Jackson conducted their analysis at a time when digital databases and electronic updating
amounted to science ﬁction. As in many other cases, registries provide another example of
the interface between property and technology. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land,
102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1330 (1993) (stating “efficiency thesis predicts that innovations in
technologies for marking, defending, and proving boundaries lead to more parcelization
because they reduce the transaction costs of private property regimes” and leveraging
example of barbed wire’s effect on American West).
69. See Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 306–07
(remarking on difficulty of registering and discerning origins of siloed wheat and suggesting “[p]ossession is often more reliable than description in sorting between personal
property”).
70. Technology may lower such demarcation costs. See Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 531, 565 (2005) [hereinafter Bell
& Parchomovsky, Property Theory] (noting development of barbed-wire demarcation
reduced costs of property protection).
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restricted to a certain jurisdiction, say New York State, and the asset, say
an automobile, can be easily moved to a different jurisdiction, say,
California.71 This problem does not arise with respect to real estate.72
The literature that is closest to our concerns has seen few
contributions in the last seventy years. A 1938 study of registration
systems by Richard Powell73 prompted a series of articles arguing against
Professor Powell’s conclusions. Professor Powell had argued against
expanded use of the Torrens land registry system—a registration system
that offers greater protection to registered owners that we discuss in
detail later in this Essay.74 Torrens systems greatly increase the importance of land registration by making registration an almost undefeatable
proof of title. Professor Powell argued that in providing state guarantees
of title in land, the Torrens system did little more than place the state in
the role of private title insurance companies, but at far greater expense.75
Professor Powell thus argued that adopting a Torrens system of land
registration would produce unnecessary costs with no real beneﬁt.76
Critics claimed that Professor Powell misread the data, and that Torrens
land registry systems provided clear advantages to the public by giving
potential purchasers guarantees of the legal validity of their
acquisitions.77 But Professor Powell’s approach won the day. Torrens land
registry systems are not widely used in the United States today.78
Only a handful of works in recent decades have revisited the old
debates. Together with several other co-authors, Thomas Miceli and C.F.
Sirmans examined issues related to title searches and land title registries

71. Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 310 (“Automobiles,
by contrast, which are not subject to a federal system, create problems when they are
moved from one jurisdiction to another . . . .”).
72. Id. (“Real property, by deﬁnition, never moves.”).
73. Richard R. Powell, Registration of the Title to Land in the State of New York
(1938).
74. See infra section II.B.3 (examining impact of Torrens system in tightening
alignment between assets and information in land registration).
75. Powell, supra note 73, at 42 (detailing costs and expenses involved in registration
system); see also id. at 49–50 (estimating “cost of an initial registration is approximately
twice the cost of an original policy of title insurance and approximately three times the
cost of a ‘re-issued’ policy”).
76. Id. at 73.
77. See, e.g., Walter Fairchild & William Springer, A Criticism of Professor Richard R.
Powell’s Book Entitled Registration of Title to Land in the State of New York, 24 Cornell L.Q.
557, 558 (1939) (suggesting Professor Powell’s account was unfair in its characterization of
Torrens System); Myres S. McDougal & John W. Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A
Regression, 48 Yale L.J. 1125, 1151 (1939) (ﬁnding Professor Powell’s objections to
Torrens system to be unjustiﬁed).
78. For an overview of the historic debates, as well as the U.S. experience with
different registration systems, see generally Blair C. Shick & Irving H. Plotkin, Torrens in
the United States: A Legal and Economic History and Analysis of American Land
Registration Systems 1–23 (1978).
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in the United States in a series of articles.79 In one article, Professors
Miceli and Sirmans provided an economic model to explain what they
saw as the advantage of the Torrens system.80 They argued that where
transaction costs are high, a Torrens system can play an important role in
allocating ownership to the higher value owner among claimants to
title.81 In another article co-authored with Henry Munneke and Geoffrey
Turnbull,82 Professors Miceli and Sirmans compared different recording
systems for land in Cook County, Illinois. Their study showed that, all
things being equal, land registered under a Torrens system is more
valuable than land whose transactions are recorded under a competing
system.83 Joseph Janczyk similarly argued in favor of the Torrens system in
an article claiming that the Torrens system would lower transaction costs
enough to justify the costs of adopting a new Torrens registration system.84 We revisit the topic of Torrens registration later in our Essay.85 It
should be noted, however, there are constant calls to establish new registries of intellectual property rights. Two representative examples include
Chagai Vinizky’s call for the adoption of a trade secrets registry86 and
Jorge Contreras’s proposal to establish a registry of patent pledges.87
Both scholars put forth very thoughtful and detailed blueprints for implementing each of the proposed registries.
B.

The Obstructive and Enabling Functions of Registering Information About
Property

As we showed in the previous section, theorists have focused primarily on the facilitating effect of registering information about property.
That is, theorists have generally restricted their analyses of the value of
registration to the positive effect registration has on easing transactions
79. See, e.g., Matthew Baker, Thomas J. Miceli, C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull,
Optimal Title Search, 31 J. Legal Stud. 139, 139–40 (2002) (modeling costs incurred by
would-be purchasers, through review of public records of land transactions, in trying to
determine chain of title).
80. Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, The Economics of Land Transfer and Title
Insurance, 10 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 81 (1995).
81. Id. at 87.
82. Thomas J. Miceli, Henry J. Munneke, C.F. Sirmans & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Title
Systems and Land Values, 45 J.L. & Econ. 565 (2002).
83. Id. at 578 (“[P]roperty registered using the Torrens system will have a higher
price than property recorded in the recording system.”).
84. Joseph T. Janczyk, An Economic Analysis of the Land Title Systems for
Transferring Real Property, 6 J. Legal Stud. 213, 220–26 (1977).
85. See infra sections II.B.3, III.B.3 (considering mechanisms and effectiveness of
Torrens systems).
86. See Vinizky, supra note 64, at 457 (advocating establishment of trade secrets
registry).
87. See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 Ariz. St. L.J. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 52–64) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing contours of
proposed registry for patent pledges).
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between selling owners and voluntary buyers. In the remainder of this
Part, we focus on the importance of the second and third functions of
registries, which we term the “obstructive” and “enabling” functions, respectively. The registration of information about property rights critically
affects not only the owner’s right to transfer but also her right to use the
asset as well as her right to exclude.
We begin by brieﬂy discussing the facilitative function and then proceed, in order, to the obstructive and enabling functions.
1. The Obstructive Function. — Registries’ facilitating function is easily
described. The facilitating function of registries aids transfers insofar as
registries constitute a reliable source of information about rights in assets. Once a registry for rights in speciﬁc assets is established and the
public can access the information it contains, third parties can readily
observe the nature of the rights in the underlying asset and the identity
of the owner. For example, once a registry for artworks exists, anyone in
the world interested in buying rights to a particular painting can easily
verify that the seller is legally entitled to transfer the rights. As noted
above,88 this means that buyers enjoy greater security in their acquisitions
and will therefore, presumably, pay more for the rights they acquire. This
makes an owner’s ability to transfer rights more valuable, and therefore
makes ownership of property rights in general more valuable.
But just as a registry conveys (and potentially certiﬁes) information,
it necessarily denies and discredits other information that is inconsistent
with the information contained in the registry. Registries enable third
parties to know who does not have rights in an asset. The following example is illustrative. Assume that Anne owns Blackacre in fee simple and
that her rights are registered in her state’s land registry. Beatrice, a con
artist, forges some legal documents pertaining to the legal rights in
Blackacre and seeks to transfer her “rights” to Cecile. In this case, there
is no information in the land registry reﬂecting Beatrice’s claimed rights.
Cecile would have no problem learning that Beatrice has no legal rights
to transfer; a quick look at the land registry would tell her as much. Just
as the information in the registry facilitates potential transfers by Anne, it
obstructs potential transfers by Beatrice. This obstructive function adds
to the value of owners’ property rights as well.
Of course, the existence of the rights registry would deter Beatrice
and like-minded parties from even attempting the illicit land transfer. By
lowering the likelihood of success of some fraudulent transfers to virtually zero, the registries create a strong disincentive to tamper with
many legal rights in land. This too results in greater security of ownership for the legal owners.
Obviously, this analysis is not conﬁned to rights in land. Registries
for rights in chattels have the same effect: They obstruct the ability of

88. See supra section I.A (outlining facilitative function of registries).
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illicit possessors to transfer movable assets.
Consider a world where information about legal property rights in
chattels cannot be reliably conveyed other than by possession. As Professors Baird and Jackson note, this is a good historical description of the
world prior to registries.89 Absent a registry of the rights to a speciﬁc
chattel, possession is the best indicia of ownership. Historically, this is
one of the reasons that possession is nine points of the law in property.90
In the world without registries, third parties would have little choice but
to rely on the fact of possession as the best evidence of ownership unless
something aroused their suspicion. But possession is a highly imperfect
proxy for ownership. Self-evidently, possession only coincides with ownership as long as the true owner maintains possession of her valuable assets.
Once the owner surrenders her possession, either wittingly or not, there
is no longer convergence between ownership and possession. This can
happen voluntarily in the case of a bailment, pledge, or loan of the asset.
It can happen involuntarily as well, as in cases of theft or fraud.
Importantly, from the vantage point of nonvoluntary takers, this
state of affairs provides an incentive to grab possession of other people’s
valuables. When market transactions are strictly possession based, nonconsensual takers can pass themselves off as legal owners simply by
acquiring possession. Where the market for automobiles relies solely on
the fact of possession to prove ownership, theft of possession of a car is a
valuable way to achieve the beneﬁt of car ownership, including the ability
to use the car and to transfer it.
Registries do not eliminate all nonconsensual takings. Conversions
for self-use can be valuable to thieves even without the possibility of future sales on the black market. In such cases, registries would diminish
convertors’ incentive to take only if the chattel is readily identiﬁable and
its use is open and notorious, as in the case of a stolen automobile. Automobiles are easy to identify and it is difficult to drive them clandestinely.
But smaller items like electric appliances present a very different case.
Televisions, for example, cannot be identiﬁed readily and can be used in
the privacy of a thief’s home.
Registries are a much stronger deterrent in a second case: conversions of chattels for transfer to a different user. Here, the existence of a
registry makes the underlying asset much less marketable in the hands of
a thief. A registry allows potential buyers to ascertain the rights in an
asset and abstain from transacting with nonregistered owners. For example, the establishment of a registry for bicycles or artworks dramatically reduces the size of the secondary market from the vantage point of
89. Baird & Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 302–03.
90. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 175, 180–81 (1983) (mapping legal
terrain dealing with preferential treatment of certain nonpossessory interests over secured
interests with respect to same property).
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thieves. Cautious purchasers would always turn to the registry to check
the identity of the rightful owner.
Naturally, some buyers would agree to transact with a thief for the
“right” price. Hence, registries cannot completely wipe out nonconsensual takings of movable property. But even here, they clearly dampen the
incentive to engage in nonconsensual appropriations for three reasons.
First, as we already noted, registries eliminate the prospect of transacting
with an honest buyer. This in turn ought to have a negative effect on the
price a thief can charge. The lower the price, the smaller the expected
return on thievery, which reduces the lure of the activity relative to legitimate alternatives. Second, registries increase the likelihood of apprehension and punishment. In a world with effective registries, illicit possessors cannot present the stolen good to potential buyers without risking
being reported to the authorities. In the presence of this risk, convertors
have to expend considerable resources on screening purchasers, which
further erodes their proﬁt margin. Third, and ﬁnally, dishonest purchasers who are willing to transact with thieves should face the same costs
if they try to resell the chattel in the future. For all these reasons, potential purchasers would be willing to pay less for the item.
The combination of these factors makes registries valuable for property owners, even where the owners have no plans to transfer title to the
asset.
Registration is a relatively simple and inexpensive act.91 Yet it provides property owners with effective protection against nonconsensual
takers and thereby enhances the value of the objects in their hands. In
the absence of a registry, property owners might be forced to engage in
duplicative expenditures to protect their possession. And the best alternative means may often be much more expensive and much less effective.
It is important to note that while the obstructive function of registries has drawn less scholarly attention than the facilitative function,
there have been a handful of important works that have noted its existence and importance. Perhaps the outstanding example is found in
Professor Shavell’s description of registries in his sweeping Foundations of
Economic Analysis of Law.92 Professor Shavell describes “discourag[ing]
theft” as one of the two principal virtues of registration systems, and he
notes that the presence of a property registry reduces the ability of the
thief both to use and to transfer the property.93 However, Professor
Shavell adds a curious note of skepticism, arguing that individual owners
are unlikely to consider the value of deterring thieves in considering

91. This is not to say that registration is costless. See infra section II.B.2 (illustrating
potential costs of registration in IP context).
92. Shavell, supra note 9, at 47–48.
93. Id.
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whether to register ownership in a particular asset, given that the marginal deterrence for a single registration is quite small.94
2. The Enabling Function. — Knowledge about title to property comes
into play in more than just transactions. Obviously, title information is
vital both to potential buyers of assets and to their potential nonconsensual takers. Less obviously, but no less vitally, knowledge about title is
necessary for owners to enjoy the beneﬁt of their property rights. An heir
who has no knowledge of her newly inherited rights has no ability to
enjoy the property, either directly or by transferring it to another. Registries can ﬁll the role of informing owners of their rights and thereby
enable owners’ use of their property. Registries thus fulﬁll an enabling
function, in parallel with their obstructive and facilitative functions. High
proﬁle cases—such as lost assets of the survivors of the Holocaust95—
provide outstanding examples of the enabling function of property registries.
There are many other examples. For instance, since there is no
registry of lost chattels, owners will ﬁnd it virtually impossible to locate
their lost goods. Aware of this fact, owners of lost property often decide
to forego the cost of searching for their goods. Of the many attractions of
Alabama, one stands out (at least for our purposes): the Unclaimed
Baggage Center, advertised under the slogan “You Never Know What
You’ll Find.”96 As many as 68,000 suitcases and luggage items are never
picked up every year and if they remain unclaimed for ninety days, most
airlines sell them to the Unclaimed Baggage Center.97 These items represent only a small fraction of the universe of lost chattels. There can be
little doubt that if a central registry for lost items existed, many owners,
with the aid of new search technologies could reunite with their lost
chattels.
Consider, as well, copyright registries. Registration is not a prerequisite for securing copyright protection; it is merely a precondition for
ﬁling an infringement suits. As a result, many expressive works that are
not involved in litigation are never registered. Since copyright protection
remains in effect seventy years after the death of the author,98 many legal
heirs and devisees may never learn of their rights under the Copyright
Act. The existence of a more comprehensive registry that covered all
copyrighted works would greatly assist authors’ heirs and devisees in
94. Id. at 48–49.
95. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (suggesting property registries might
have alerted heirs to the existence of such assets).
96. Unclaimed Baggage Ctr., http://www.unclaimedbaggage.com/ [http://perma.cc/
SK4T-4WAW] (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
97. Terry Maxon, Alabama Store Is Last Stop for Lost Luggage, Dall. Morning News
(May 4, 2011, 9:41 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airline-industry/20110504alabama-store-is-last-stop-for-lost-luggage.ece [http://perma.cc/DGA7-PJK4] (last updated
May 5, 2011, 9:21 AM).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
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becoming informed of their rights. Indeed, the problem of owners not
knowing their copyright rights is acknowledged as a contributing factor
to the problem of “orphan” works.99
At the same time, such examples illustrate the difficulty registries
have in enabling owners’ use of their assets. Simply put, registries are not
self-executing. Registries in the modern world do not provide information to interested parties automatically. Registries reveal their information only upon being searched. When owners do not suspect that they
own assets, there is little reason for them to start searching the various
registries around the world that may reveal some hidden ownership. It is
for this reason that self-appointed heir hunters,100 and other detectives
who seek unknowing owners, are able to collect such high fees for their
services.
The enabling function of registries should not be dismissed, however. In the information age, search protocols are improving and greater
quantities of information are becoming available. It is not difficult to
imagine a day in the not-distant future when individuals will be able to
program repeated searches in multiple registries for assets of which they
may have lost track or about which they might never have known.
C.

Measuring the Informational Value of Property Registration

It is not surprising that empirical studies of the value of property
registration are few and far between. As we have noted, there is little
writing directly on the question of the value of information about property rights.101 However, those empirical studies that have been conducted
seem, in the main, to reinforce our theoretical claims about the facilitative and obstructive value of property registrations.

99. In the United States, a study conducted by Carnegie Mellon found that twentytwo percent of copyrighted works were orphan works. Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries,
Reply Comment in Response to Notice of Inquiry about Orphan Works 3 (2005),
http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf [http://perma.cc
/53P3-437A]. A 2010 report written for the European Commission estimates the number
of orphan copyrighted works in Europe at three million books (or thirteen percent of all
in-copyright works). Anna Vuopala, European Comm’n, Directorate Gen. Info. Soc’y &
Media, Assessment of the Orphan Works Issue and Costs for Rights Clearance 5 (2010),
http://www.ace-ﬁlm.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Copyright_anna_report-1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FP8N-8GCC]. A 2011 report by the British Library suggested that the
percentage of orphan works may be as high as forty-three percent. Press Release, British
Library, Electronic Clearance of Orphan Works Signiﬁcantly Accelerates Mass Digitisation
(2011), http://www.bl.uk/press-releases/2011/september/electronic-clearance-of-orphanworks-signiﬁcantly-accelerates-mass-digitisation [http://perma.cc/Y47R-KEXK].
100. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting utility of heir hunters in realigning assets with ownership information).
101. See supra Introduction (assessing prior scholarship on intersection between
property and information).
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Professor de Soto’s empirical work on formalization of legal rights in
property may provide a crude measure of the added value registration
creates for land owners. Professor de Soto famously estimated that in
Peru alone there is a loss of $74 billion in what he calls “dead capital.”102
The loss stems from the fact that when property rights are not formally
recognized by the state they cannot be used by the owners to raise capital
via securitized transactions. In the legal world, formalization of rights in
land and registration typically go hand in hand as a practical matter.
However, analytically, the two concepts are distinct. It may very well be
that in the cases studied by Professor de Soto, most of the beneﬁt would
accrue to owners from formalization, irrespective of registration. Hence,
one cannot cleanly translate Professor de Soto’s studies into proof of the
value of registration.
Additionally, subsequent empirical research has called into question
some of Professor de Soto’s predictions about the beneﬁts associated with
titling. For example, Jean-Philippe Platteau, who studied land titling in
sub-Saharan Africa, argued that the expected beneﬁts from land titling
were overestimated103 and that it is far from clear that they outweigh the
costs.
In short, so long as studies conﬂate titling efforts with registration, it
is very difficult to prove empirically the facilitative effects of land registries. In addition, there are often other confounding factors that affect
land values at the same time as registration, in particular since the
beneﬁts of land registries are often fully realized years after the initial
registration, making them hard to track.104 It is not surprising that economists105 and the World Bank106 have emphasized the need for empirical
work on the long-term effects of registries.
102. De Soto, supra note 26, at 31 (“The value of extralegally held rural and urban
real estate in Peru amounts to some $74 billion.”). De Soto’s ﬁgures have been disputed.
See Kevin E. Davis, The Rules of Capitalism, 22 Third World Q. 675, 678 (2001) (reviewing
Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails
Everywhere Else (2000)) (calling de Soto’s ﬁndings “provocative” but lamenting his
ﬁgures “are presented in such a cursory fashion that at times it is difficult to derive any
sense of how they were produced”); Jim Thomas, Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, 34 J. Latin Am. Stud.
189, 189–90 (2002) (book review) (questioning methodologies employed by de Soto in
valuing dead capital); Christopher Woodruff, Review of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital, 39
J. Econ. Literature 1215, 1220–22 (2001) (book review) (“[T]he data available in the
book’s appendix suggest that $9.24 trillion is an exaggerated estimate [of the value of
developing countries’ untitled real estate].”).
103. Jean-Philippe Platteau, The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment, 27 Dev. & Change 29, 74–75 (1996).
104. See de Soto, supra note 26, at 46–47 (explaining mystery of capital’s successes to
be shrouded in thousands of legislations, regulations, and institutions that govern recording system and render effects difficult to observe).
105. See, e.g., Grenville Barnes, A Comparative Evaluation Framework for CadastreBased Land Information Systems (CLIS) in Developing Countries 3 (Land Tenure Ctr.,
Research Paper No. 102, 1990), http://minds.wisconsin.edu/handle/1793/34180 (on ﬁle
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The need for empirical work is particularly striking when it comes to
obstructive effects. There has been no theoretician with the stature of
Professor de Soto to take on the question of property information on
thieves, so it is no surprise that no systematic examination of the
magnitude of obstructive effects is to be found. Nonetheless, there are
some tantalizing hints that the obstructive effect may be signiﬁcant.
Some locales, such as Lane County, Oregon, have reported a reduction in boat theft incidents as well as an impressively high recovery rate
thanks to the establishment of a boat registry intended to reduce the
number of boats thefts. According to the County Sheriff, “Boat theft
reports in Oregon are the lowest in decades, and the recovery rate for
stolen boats is at an all-time high.”107 Impressively, the recovery rate in
Lane County is roughly a third, which is two or three times higher than
the national recovery rate that stands at ten to twenty percent.108
Several European countries have launched stolen-phone databases
in order to reduce the rate of cellphone theft in large cities. In the
United Kingdom, the measure is credited with a twenty percent
reduction in cellphone-related crime (from 10,000 cases to 8,000) between 2004 and 2012 even though the number of cellphones nearly
doubled in that period.109 The perceived success of the registry has
prompted calls to force cellphone providers in the United States, where
cellphone-related crime has gone up in recent years, to adopt a similar
measure.110
But the most detailed data on what we term the obstructive function
of registries comes from Norway. Bicycle theft has become so widespread
in Norway that stolen bicycles have become a currency of exchange
among thieves.111 In the early 1990s, the number of thefts skyrocketed to
100,000 per year, and stolen bicycles were resold for ﬁve to ten percent of

with the Columbia Law Review) (“Evaluation efforts have been frustrated by problems
related to the inappropriate documentation of existing systems and the absence of
effective evaluation models.”).
106. Cf. Nicholas H. Stern, Foreword to Klaus W. Deininger, World Bank, Land
Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, at ix, ix (2003) (“[D]iscussions on land policies are often characterized by preconceived notions and ideological viewpoints rather
than by careful analysis of the potential contribution of land policies to broader development . . . .”).
107. Owners Can Reduce Boat Theft with Basic Steps, Lane Cty., Or., http://
lanecounty.org/Departments/Sheriff/PoliceServices/Pages/stolenboats.aspx [http://perma.
cc/$H37-MV6J] (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
108. Id.
109. Rolfe Winkler, Carriers Band to Fight Cellphone Theft, Wall St. J. (Apr. 9, 2012,
10:52 PM), http://on.wsj.com/HYwctV (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
110. See id. (discussing success of United Kingdom program and noting calls for similar registry programs to be implemented in United States and Canada).
111. Bicycle Theft in Norway, http://www.sykkeltyveri.no/bicycle_theft.html [http:
//perma.cc/4PFA-39PF] (last modiﬁed May 28, 2005, 9:13 AM).
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the original price.112 Following the implementation of a related registry,
the annual number of stolen bikes in Norway fell from 100,000 in 1995 to
60,000 in 2004.113 The bicycle thefts reported to the police were reduced
from 26,577 to 19,141.114 The thefts reported to the insurance industry
were reduced from 18,100 to 9,468, and their losses were reduced from
NOK 70.8 million (roughly USD 12 million) to NOK 34.0 million (less
than USD 6 million).115
While the data is far from deﬁnitive, it does provide tentative support for the existence of positive facilitative and obstructive effects in
property registries.
II. REGISTRY STRATEGIES AND THE INFORMATION–ASSET PARADOX
In Part I, we showed that registries function in multiple markets
simultaneously. Registries add value to property rights by facilitating transactions in licit markets and by obstructing transactions in illicit markets.
A complementary feature of registries elaborated in this Part is that
they inspire a tug-of-war among different market participants as they
repeatedly take action to protect their ability to enjoy property beneﬁts.
Owners want the registries that best preserve their rights in order to best
facilitate licit transactions and obstruct illicit transactions. Thieves and
other nonconsensual takers, by contrast, want registries that fail to preserve the rights of owners. In particular, thieves desire registries with the
smallest obstructive effect on illicit transactions. The contradictory motivations of owners and nonconsensual takers engender dynamic effects
that have generally been overlooked by the extant scholarly literature.
The information contained in registries drastically affects the ability to
enjoy the beneﬁts of property. Consequently, registries’ information
shapes the behavior not only of owners and potential buyers (and other
consensual users and possessors), but of all the private actors in the property universe, including potential nonconsensual takers and users. Each
set of parties seeks to manipulate the information to its advantage.
It might seem that this observation adds little to our normative
understanding of the regulation of information about title in property.
On ﬁrst impression, it appears that the conﬂict of interests between lawful owner and thief simply points toward the desirability of better registries with better veriﬁed data. Surprisingly, we show that this is not the
case. Registries with better data do not necessarily have the greatest obstructive effect on illicit markets, and they may not result in the greatest
property value. In some cases, the better the registry’s data, the greater
the danger to the registered asset. This is because both owner and thief
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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are not necessarily interested in the ﬁdelity of the information in the
registry per se. Rather, both are interested in the degree to which the
asset aligns with information about the asset and its owner.
Consider, ﬁrst, cases where information and asset are not stably
aligned, or where thieves and other nonconsensual takers can reliably
control either information or the conﬁguration of an asset. For example,
consider a registry for boats, where the registry records the ownership of
every boat by an identity number built into the frame of every boat in
nonremovable fashion. In this case, information and asset are stably
aligned. However, imagine as well that the registry is maintained in a
computer database that enjoys only minimal security and can be easily
hacked. In this case, owners would realize little or no obstructive value
from registries, and registries provide little or no additional stability in
ownership.
Conversely, if information and asset are stably aligned, and the
owner can also reliably control both information and the conﬁguration
of an asset, owners can enjoy the greatest obstructive value of registries
and therefore the greatest value in their assets.
There is an important asymmetry here, however. For owners to enjoy
the obstructive value of registries, they must ensure ﬁdelity of all elements. For thieves, one weak link is enough. For instance, in our boat
example, the weak link in the lack of database ﬁdelity is enough to
undermine the value of the registry for the owners. Paradoxically, the
high quality of the information in the database will actually help the
thieves. The comprehensiveness of the registry will make it easier for
thieves to steal boats and sell them to third parties, as they can do so
simply by tampering with the ownership data in the registry without ever
taking possession of the vessel.
Other times, where the identifying information can be easily removed from assets, the existence of the registry actually encourages
nonconsensual takers to undercut the alignment between asset and information by defacing one or the other. Thus, in some cases, registries
encourage destruction of valuable attributes of assets or information about
them.
The surprising result of this is that good registries can sometimes
lead to adverse property results. We call this dynamic “the information–
asset paradox.” Unraveling this paradox, and understanding when and
how registries help property value requires a close examination of the
dynamic effects of registries. The existence of registries encourages both
owners and potential takers of the property rights (whether consensual
or nonconsensual takers) to play close heed to the relationship between
information and asset. Unfortunately, since different actors have different aims—owners, for example, want a close and stable relationship,
while thieves do not—the different actors constantly compete to secure
or upset the relationship between registered information and the under-
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lying asset. By examining the actions likely to be taken by both sides in
this contest, we can understand the dynamic effects of registries and
better analyze the utility of registries.
In this Part, we explore the competing strategies of owner and nonconsensual takers, and explain the likely effects on information, asset,
and the alignment between information and asset. We conclude this Part
by noting the possibility that the roles (and corresponding strategies) of
owners and nonconsensual takers may be ﬂipped in some common and
foreseeable circumstances.
A.

Strategies of Nonconsensual Takers

For potential thieves, the world consists of many assets to which the
thief has no legal right but that can nevertheless serve as a potential
source of utility. A thief who looks at a car parked on the street, for
instance, sees potential utility in joyrides (or other potential direct uses
of the car by the thief) or in proﬁts in fencing the car (i.e., the proﬁts
that can be realized by selling possession of the car in the market for
stolen goods). The economic literature on property rights views such
potential utility as an illicit but important component of the utility of
“economic property rights.”116 Thieves can realize some of the utility of
assets, and the utility that they can realize must be taken into account.117
Of course, this is not something the authors view in a positive light.
Society does not aim, and should not aim, to aid thieves.118 But undesirable though it may be, the potential utility of thieves is important
because it affects the stability of licit property rights. Society must pay
attention to the utility of thieves because the disutility of thievery is an
important social aim.119 The less utility a thief is likely to realize from any
given asset, the less likely he or she is to attempt to steal it. In turn, the
more security enjoyed by the licit owner of property rights in an asset, the
more the property rights are worth.
In a world where registries provide readily available information
about the legal provenance of an asset, would-be thieves (and other nonconsensual takers of assets) face an uphill battle. First, registries make it
116. See Barzel, Economic Analysis, supra note 44, at 141–42 (using example of theft
to illustrate distinction between economic and legal rights); Yoram Barzel, The Capture of
Wealth by Monopolists and the Protection of Property Rights, 14 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 393,
394 (1994) (deﬁning economic rights in terms of ability to derive utility from property
rather than in terms of legal entitlement).
117. See Barzel, Economic Analysis, supra note 44, at 3–4 (noting lack of legal rights
reduces but does not negate ability to derive economic utility from stolen goods).
118. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, Property Theory, supra note 70, at 571–72 (“The point
and purpose of property law is to separate rightful owners from unlawful claimants . . . .”).
119. Cf. Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1095, 1098–104 (2007) (arguing property outlaws have enabled reevaluation of distribution and content of property entitlements and cautioning law should therefore be
careful not to overdeter nonviolent refusals to abide by existing property arrangements).
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far more difficult for thieves to dispose of stolen items. Would-be buyers
can consult registries and verify that the selling thief has no title to convey. Second, registries can make it more difficult for the thief to utilize
the item on his or her own. The item might be recognized as stolen, and
the thief might be exposed. For instance, a thief who joyrides in a car
may get caught if observed by a police officer who compares the license
plate number to the information in a registry of stolen cars.
Realizing this, thieves can take precautionary measures to protect
the utility they expect to realize from their illicit trade. Thieves need only
worry about getting caught if information is readily available and veriﬁed, and if the information is likely to compromise the thieves’ expected
gain. This means that thieves can protect their expected utility by blunting the expected adverse effects of truthful information. Thieves can take
measures to reduce the likelihood of getting caught by creating mismatches between the description of assets in registries and their appearance in the real world. This can be achieved by changing the deﬁning
characteristics of the asset or by manipulating the information in the
relevant registry.
Concretely, nonconsensual takers employ three strategies to compromise the value of registries to owners. The ﬁrst is to reconﬁgure the assets
themselves in order to cause misalignment between the new form of asset
and the information about the assets in their old form. One example of
this strategy is the operation of “chop” shops, where cars are dismembered into spare parts that are then sold separately as “scrap.” Jewelry
thieves may employ a similar strategy when they melt down their stolen
pieces into precious metals.
To fully appreciate the implications of asset reconﬁguration, consider recent initiatives around the world to establish registration systems
for smartphones to combat rampant theft of these devices.120 At ﬁrst
blush, the case for a cellphone registry appears indisputable. Smartphones bear identiﬁcation information and can be easily disabled by
their manufacturers. However, the possibility that thieves may reconﬁgure the stolen phones renders the analysis much more complicated
and nuanced. Registration, even when coupled with remote disabling of
the device, will not put an end to smartphone theft as long as thieves can
turn a proﬁt from taking the devices apart and selling the electronic
120. Such a registry was recently launched in Canada. See Ellen Roseman, New
Registry Lets You Spot Stolen Phones, Toronto Star (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.
thestar.com/business/tech_news/2013/10/01/new_registry_lets_you_spot_stolen_phones
_roseman.html [http://perma.cc/8S8A-M5HP] (detailing Canada’s telephone registry
program). In the United States, private companies considered adopting a similar solution.
See Thefts of Cell Phones Rise Rapidly Nationwide, USA Today (Oct. 20, 2012), http:
//www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/10/20/thefts-of-cell-phones-rise-rapidly-nationwide/16
46767 [http://perma.cc/96AA-Q4QC] (citing expectation carriers would in near future
launch individual databases allowing consumers to report stolen cell phones and have
them disabled).
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components individually. Indeed, a comprehensive registration system
would drive nonconsensual takers toward this strategy, making it virtually
impossible for smartphone owners to retrieve their valuable devices.
Of course, the manufacturers of smartphones and other electronic
goods can decrease the proﬁtability of this strategy by making it very
difficult to take apart their devices. In the extreme, they can manufacture
fully integrated devices that cannot be dismembered. But this would create a second-order cost for rightful owners: It would dramatically increase
the cost of repairs. At the end of the day, therefore, any decision regarding the desirability of a smartphone registry requires policymakers to
adopt a dynamic perspective that takes account of the full range of responses of consensual nontakers to the establishment of a registry.
The second strategy employed by nonconsensual takers is to obscure
the alignment between goods and information attesting to the legal
rights in them. For instance, a car thief may replace the license plates of
a car in order to cause law enforcement officers to misidentify the vehicle. Thieves, in fact, routinely remove identifying numbers from stolen
cars in order to reduce the possibility of matching the registry to the
stolen asset.121
The third strategy, and the most difficult for nonconsensual takers to
employ, is to leave the asset and registry information about the asset
intact, but to attempt to utilize the information in the registry to take
control of ownership. In one version, nonconsensual takers may attempt
to rewrite entries in the registry to show that they are the true owners.
For instance, modern bank robbers may try to effect heists through
entirely electronic means. Instead of physically entering a bank and
demanding cash, the thieves may seek to hack into the data registry of
accounts and reassign to themselves apparent ownership of assets that
belong to others. Such electronic thefts, unfortunately, are possible in
even the most sophisticated data systems. For instance, thieves in the
European Union were recently able to hack into a Czech registry of carbon-dioxide emission allowances and reassign the rights to make it
appear that they lawfully possessed allowances.122
In a different version of this strategy, instead of hacking the registry
to change information about the owners, the nonconsensual takers
attempt to masquerade as the owners. The popular and dangerous fraud
121. See Edward R. Kleemans, Organized Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering, 35
Crime & Just. 163, 191–92 (2007) (explaining modus operandi of criminal organizations
involved in illicit trafficking of stolen cars).
122. See Nathanial Gronewold & John J. Fialka, European Commission Halts Transfers
of Carbon Emissions Allowances Until Thefts Are Sorted Out, N.Y. Times (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/01/20/20climatewire-european-commission-haltstransfers-of-carbo-22394.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting suspension
of transfers of carbon-dioxide emission allowances pending investigation of “computeraided thievery [resulting in] the loss of 475,000 [emissions allowances] from a registry in
the Czech Republic”).
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known as “identity theft” involves nonconsensual takers appropriating
enough personal information about an individual victim to allow themselves to convince keepers of registries, such as banks and credit card
companies, that the takers are actually the individual in question.123 The
identity thieves then use the false identities to obtain assets registered in
the name of the victims.124
Before concluding our analysis of nonconsensual takers’ strategies,
we should note that none of these strategies is cost free, and costs will
alter the choices of nonconsensual takers.
We begin with the cost structure of nonconsensual takers’ illicit activity. No matter what the nonconsensual takers do to improve their
chances of successful appropriation, they will have to invest some time,
effort, or expense. Disﬁguring assets can reduce the usefulness of the
assets—the parts of a car, for instance, while still valuable, are generally
less valuable than a fully functioning automobile—and demand expertise
in the defacing. Forging informational interfaces, such as automobile licenses or certiﬁcates of authenticity, demands expertise and care. Hacking into databases may require a great deal of expertise and time.
Sometimes, these costs will be so large as to decisively protect the
asset from theft. In some cases, these costs will deter thieves from taking
items nonconsensually because the theft is no longer cost effective, or
because similar items may be stolen at less cost. But in other cases, nonconsensual takers may still ﬁnd theft worthwhile, notwithstanding the
cost. Just as signiﬁcantly for our purposes, the costs may be uneven, pushing nonconsensual takers to adopt a less costly strategy. For instance,
where information is very secure, but the physical asset less so, thieves
may ﬁnd themselves increasingly interested in reconﬁguring assets. The
more secure car ownership databases are, the more attractive “chopping”
cars is to thieves. Registries will therefore have uneven deterrence effects
on illicit activities. Sometimes, instead of deterring theft, registries will
just drive illicit activities into different channels.
Indeed, in some cases, paradoxically, registries may increase certain
kinds of illicit activities. This is because registries may make illicit possession look secure to buyers. When potential buyers examine the providence of ownership, they do so on the basis of the information they have.
If ownership information is recorded in registries, potential buyers will
generally rely on the information in registries to determine whether the
seller is genuine. If thieves can take control of the information in the

123. See Penelope N. Lazarou, Small Businesses and Identity Theft: Reallocating the
Risk of Loss, 10 N.C. Banking Inst. 305, 308–09 (2006) (surveying multiple ways in which
such identity thefts occur).
124. See Identity Theft, Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
websites/idtheft.html [http://perma.cc/2ASW-NL38] (last updated Nov. 2, 2015) (listing
ways in which thieves can leverage misappropriated identifying information to obtain
assets in victims’ names).
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registry, they can make their control of an asset look legitimate, and
thereby enjoy the beneﬁts of the registry’s facilitating function.
B.

Strategies of Owners

Owners are not left without recourse when faced with the threat of
strategic behavior by potential nonconsensual takers. They, too, can take
steps to protect their rights. Owners have one great advantage over
thieves: The law is on their side. As a result, owners can rely on the state
to spread information about their licit rights through state-provided registries and also rely on other state-provided protections. But even without
the assistance of state-provided registries, owners may take steps to protect their rights. In fact, the primary strategies for owners will be the
opposite of nonconsensual takers. Owners will try to secure a stable alignment between registered information and legal rights, the accuracy of
information about owners’ rights, and a favorable conﬁguration of assets.
In this section, we do not assume the existence of registries. Rather,
we look at how owners might try to protect themselves, both in the presence and in the absence of registries. In the next section, we look at the
way the owners’ strategies interplay with one another, particularly when
there are registries recording property rights. We do this in order to
highlight the separate roles of the owner in recording information and
of the state in facilitating such recording.
1. Reconﬁguring Assets. — In the preceding section, we discussed how
thieves change the makeup of assets in order to reduce the risk of apprehension.125 In this section, we show that owners, too, employ a similar
strategy. However, there is a critical difference between the two cases:
thieves reconﬁgure assets ex post, after the theft; owners do so ex ante to
prevent theft.
By reconﬁguring their assets, owners can make them less attractive
to illicit takers. For instance, owners may prefer that automobile stereos
be electronically coded so that they can only operate while connected to
the correct automobile. Likewise, owners of bicycles may prefer versions
that do not have “quick release” parts so as to prevent thieves from
stealing pieces of the bicycle.
The owners’ interest in blocking thieves may lead to an extreme and
counterintuitive strategy for conﬁguring assets: damaging their own
goods or acquiring lower quality goods ab initio. In his classical article,
The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the Optimal Value of an
Asset,126 Professor Douglas Allen compiles examples of cases in which this
strategy may be employed.

125. See supra section II.A (setting forth strategies and incentives of nonconsensual
takers).
126. Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the
Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J. Legal Stud. S339 (2002).
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Professor Allen’s article was inspired by the plight of the black rhino
in Africa. Poachers have driven the population of the black rhino to the
point of extinction, leading conservationists to think of possible solutions
to save the animal. Tragically, poachers are not interested in the rhinos in
their entirety. They hunt the rhinos down for one reason only: the rhino’s horn. As it turns out, the horn can be used for the manufacturing of
various functional and ornamental objects, and legend has it that the
horn has various medical and spiritual properties.127 Poachers who are
indifferent to the fate of rhinos kill the rhinos solely in order to saw off
the horn. The rhino’s horn thus became the bane of the black rhino’s
existence.128 Professor Allen and others suggested that the black rhino
could be saved if its horn were surgically removed by environmental
organizations.129 The rhino can easily survive without its horn—indeed, it
is of very little use to it—but in the sad reality that emerged in Africa, the
rhino cannot survive with it.130
This observation led Professor Allen to a more general insight. Property owners may be better off damaging or compromising their own assets if by doing so they make them less attractive to thieves.131 Two examples illustrate this possibility. The ﬁrst is the removal of stereo systems
from cars by owners, or, in some cases, the installation of inferior-quality
stereos. Owners ﬁnd this damage to their own utility worthwhile when
the car will be parked in areas where car-radio theft is rampant. By installing a cheap stereo, the car owner compromises the enjoyment she
derives from driving the car. However, this reduction in utility is outweighed by the utility of being secure in the knowledge that her radio
will not get stolen and that her car will not be damaged in the process.
A second example is bicycles. Multiple students in urban campuses
choose to ride average and even below-average-quality bicycles in order
to avoid falling prey to the predation of bicycle thieves.132 In this case,

127. See id. at S348 (“Although the horn is used to decorate ceremonial dagger
handles in the Middle East, its chief use is in Asian medicine, where it is ground into a
powder for the relief of fevers.”).
128. See id. at S349 (“[B]lack rhinos numbered between 65,000 and 100,000 in 1970;
today, population estimates are between 3,000 and 4,000.”).
129. Id.
130. See id. at S348–50 (“Dehorning . . . does not hurt the rhino . . . and it appears
that the policy has reduced poaching.”).
131. See id. at S347–48 (suggesting such actions are rational where “costs of enforcing
the property right decrease by more than the value of the property right”).
132. Riding cheaper, used bicycles is an effective way to avoid bicycle theft. See
Frederika Whitehead, Bike Thief Tells How to Stop Your Cycle from Being Stolen,
Guardian: Green Living Blog (Sept. 13, 2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/green-living-blog/2010/sep/13/bike-thief-stolen-tips
[http://perma.cc/D7S5GKCN] (recommending bicycle owners buy cheaper bikes because bicycle thieves
frequently target expensive bikes and monitor locations where expensive bikes are
regularly parked).
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too, the owner voluntarily agrees to give up a certain level of enjoyment
in exchange for greater security of possession.
The rationale behind the owners’ actions in both cases—the car
stereo case and the bicycle case—is the same. The sacriﬁce made by the
owner, while diminishing the value to her, effects an even greater diminution of value to a potential thief.
Asset conﬁgurations that foil thieves need not be extremely harmful
to the owner. Many times, assets are structured to have simple security
systems that owners can manage more easily than thieves. Automobiles
have keys and sometimes electronic codes. Computers and telephones
can be programmed to operate only after the entry of a password.
Sometimes, asset conﬁgurations are designed to protect the integrity
of registrations. Cellular telephones, for instance, may have identiﬁcation
numbers coded into the software so that stolen cellphones can be identiﬁed.133 Vehicle identiﬁcation numbers (VINs) are placed in automobiles in multiple locations in order to ensure that the numbers cannot
be easily removed.134 These methods do not directly affect the functioning of the asset. The car drives in exactly the same fashion no matter
where, and in how many locations, the VIN is located. However, the more
secure the VIN, the harder it is to separate the asset (the automobile)
from the information that is the key to successful registration (the VIN).
2. Managing Information. — Aside from minding the conﬁguration of
assets themselves, owners can take other steps to protect their property
rights through managing registered information. Thus, a second expected focus of owners’ efforts is to secure the accuracy of information about
owners’ rights. For instance, owners will try to ensure that their ownership of a piece of land is properly registered in the local land registry or
recorder of deeds. The vitality of this strategy is obvious, but it is not
always easy to implement.
Several factors confound the accuracy of information in registries.
To begin with, the act of registration is not costless. While presumably
most owners in most circumstances will feel that the beneﬁts of registration exceed the costs, it is at least theoretically possible that some
owners will feel the investment is not worth it. This concern is particularly acute with respect to some kinds of intellectual property registration. Consider, for instance, the registration of a patent. In order to
133. See Steve Gold, Cracking GSM, Network Security, Apr. 2011, at 12, 14 (noting
many cellphones are programmed with “device-speciﬁc . . . unique codes” which can be
used for identiﬁcation of mobile devices).
134. See Jill Liphart, How to Prevent Car Theft, Quote Wizard (June 29, 2015),
http://quotewizard.com/auto-insurance/prevent-car-theft [http://perma.cc/XEK5-5MKH]
(“Displaying the designated Vehicle Identiﬁcation Number (VIN) on as many major parts
of a vehicle as possible makes it difficult for thieves to part-out stolen cars.”); see generally
VIN Decoder, Research Maniacs, http://researchmaniacs.com/VIN/VIN-Decoder.html
[http://perma.cc/D669-YKTZ] (last visited Nov. 3, 2015) (detailing process of creating
VINs).
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maximize the chances that a registered patent will be considered valid,
the inventor should search prior patents (and other publications) in
order to determine the prior art and know what parts of the invention
can legitimately be considered novel and patentable.135 The need to engage in signiﬁcant searches prior to registration greatly increases the cost
of recording information in the registry; if the patent revenues are not
expected to be signiﬁcant enough, the inventor will not ﬁnd registration
to be cost effective. Copyright registration poses a related but converse
challenge. Under the Copyright Act, registration is optional: Owners
must register only if they wish to commence an infringement suit;
otherwise, they are not legally compelled to register their works.136
Consequently, most copyrighted works are not registered and the public
has no way of knowing whether a particular work is copyrighted or not.
While registration is relatively low in cost, the beneﬁt of registration is
extremely low until the owner is ready to commence a lawsuit. Thus,
many copyright owners do not ﬁnd registration to be cost effective.
Second, information about rights is not constant. For instance, while
the purchaser of Blackacre may take care to register all the information
about her purchase at the time of the transaction, numerous events will
occur over time to render the information incomplete. Workers may obtain mechanics’ liens. The municipality may acquire a tax lien. The owner may negotiate the creation of binding covenants with neighbors. The
owner may marry and bestow a share in the property upon her spouse.
Owners may die and leave property as an inheritance to heirs. If owners
wish to keep the registrations up to date, they must constantly keep
themselves apprised of the information recorded in the registry and
supplement or correct it.
Third, even if owners are perfectly vigilant, they may not be able to
perfect the information in the registry. Some registries are set up not to
accommodate certain information. Land registries may register deeds,
for instance, but not inchoate spousal claims based on theories of marital
property. They may register liens, but not real covenants. Registries are
not selective about their information simply in order to be difficult. It is
costly to maintain registries and to verify information. Registries manage
these costs by being selective about the information they contain.
Fourth, even where willing owners meet willing registrars, the registries may not succeed in maintaining perfect accuracy of information.
Most information about property rights favors some parties at the ex135. See, e.g., Long, Information Costs, supra note 1, at 499 (noting in order to obtain
patent protection inventor must prove, inter alia, “how the invention is different from
others in the ﬁeld (the prior art)”).
136. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 494
(2004) (pointing out registration is no longer prerequisite for obtaining copyright
protection and is required only for “initiation of an infringement action”); see also 17
U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012) (outlining role of “certiﬁcate of registration” in copyright infringement suits).
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pense of others. If Susan establishes her mechanics’ lien over Thomas’s
Blackacre, she is better off, but Thomas is worse off. This potentially
places owners in conﬂict with other actors, leaving registries in the
uncomfortable position of deciding between them.137 In some cases,
neither Susan nor Thomas possesses perfect knowledge of the facts and
law, and even if they do, they may choose not to share that knowledge
with the registry. Adjudicating the relative strengths of competing claims
will often be costly and beyond the scope of officials managing a registry.
Indeed, even without competitors over registry claims, information is not
free and not always readily available. The owner may simply not have
enough veriﬁable information about predecessors in title or other vital
facts for her claim to warrant registration.
Fifth, and ﬁnally, owners may elect not to register their rights for
privacy reasons.138 Some owners may not want the rest of the world to
know of the full extent of their possessions. This explains the presence of
so many anonymous bidders in art auctions. In some cases, the preference for privacy (or secrecy) may be a personality trait or an idiosyncratic preference. In other cases, it may be driven by practical concerns. For example, an art collector may refrain from registering her
ownership of a famous painting out of fear that doing so may “invite”
others to steal it from her.
For all these reasons, even the best registries are imperfect. And not
all registries even try to be perfect. The degree to which such registries
can succeed will naturally depend on the ability of the managers of the
registry to convince owners to participate, as well as the ability to verify
information. Enforcement powers can therefore be critical to the success
of a registry. Many private registration systems will be of limited utility, as
they will lack the ability to cajole or force centralization of information.139
Even state registration systems may suffer from such problems.140 This is
one of the reasons title insurance and other legal means of protecting
137. Mechanics’ liens are a particularly apt example insofar as they can be registered
automatically and do not require court approval. Yet even in those cases where registration
is not automatic and requires the administrator of the registry to turn to a court or
tribunal for guidance, indirect costs are imposed on the parties in the course of resolving
the competing claims.
138. Arguably, issues of privacy are among the disputed items in the bitter controversy
about registration of private ownership of ﬁrearms.
139. Cf. Kimball Foster, Certiﬁcates of Possessory Title: A Sensible Addition to
Minnesota’s Successful Torrens System, 40 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 112, 113–14 (2013)
(chronicling Minnesota’s implementation of Torrens public registration system and subsequent gains in public conﬁdence due to enforcement powers wielded and effectively put
to use by panoply of judges, examiners, and registrars).
140. See Charles Szypszak, Public Registries and Private Solutions: An Evolving
American Real Estate Conveyance Regime, 24 Whittier L. Rev. 663, 680 (2003) (“The
American Torrens system’s limitations have resulted in its abandonment in several states,
and very infrequent use in others. In those states that enacted registration systems,
registration was voluntary, allowing parties to a conveyance to opt for the traditional
system.”).
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against ﬂaws in information systems persist even in the presence of stateprovided registries.141
3. Aligning Information and Asset. — A third likely aim of owners will
be to secure a stable alignment between registered information and legal
rights. Physically aligning title information and asset is a simple and intuitive strategy that owners often adopt, though not uniformly with all assets. Perhaps the simplest version of this strategy is the practice of writing
one’s name in a book or sewing it into a jacket. More sophisticated versions of alignment seek to permanently etch into an asset the identifying
features that will also appear in a property registry. For example, vehicle
identity numbers for cars may be electronically coded into the engine as
well as machine-stamped in several places in the automobile.142
Realty has been the realm of many interesting and successful efforts
to stably align information and asset. One can divide these efforts into
two categories: legal and technological.
The most important legal change that has improved the alignment
of information and asset is the Torrens system of land registration. Sir
Robert Richard Torrens is generally credited with having created the
Torrens system, ﬁrst adopted in South Australia in 1858.143 Prior to the
Torrens system, land registries recorded documents attesting to land
transfers.144 For instance, if Alice sold land to Beatrice, the buyer and
seller would take the deed to the relevant recordation office, which
would thereafter maintain a copy of the deed. Each deed would carry a
nonstandardized description of the land covered in the transaction. The
Torrens system reverses matters. In the Torrens system, it is the land that
is registered, rather than the transaction. The Torrens system is based on

141. Id. at 686–92 (mapping beneﬁts of title insurance and suggesting it achieves same
results as Torrens system at far lesser cost); see also John L. McCormack, Torrens and
Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer Age, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 61, 121–
23 (1992) (pressing for retention of recording system coupled with title assurance and
computerization as means of importing many of perceived beneﬁts of public registration
system).
142. See How OBDII Helps You When Buying a Used Car, Scantool Garage (May 7,
2012), http://www.obdautodoctor.com/scantool-garage/how-obdii-helps-you-when-buying
-a-used-car/ [http://perma.cc/2BQ8-63GD] (noting VIN can be retrieved from engine
through on-board diagnostic software); What You Need to Know About VIN Etching, Ellis
& Salazar Garage & Body Shop (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.ellisandsalazar.com/what-youneed-to-know-about-vin-etching/ [http://perma.cc/K7SK-NS78] (describing purpose and
process of VIN etching).
143. Blair C. Schick & Irving H. Plotkin, Torrens in the United States: A Legal and
Economic History and Analysis of American Land-Registration Systems 17 (1978); A.G.
Lang, Computerised Land Title and Land Information, 10 Monash U. L. Rev. 196, 197
(1984).
144. See Szypszak, supra note 140, at 664–71 (surveying features and risks of
“conveyance recording” systems).
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a map of area covered by the registry.145 When one wants to record a sale
of land, instead of writing up and recording a deed that describes the
asset to be transferred, one records the transfer of a certiﬁcate that refers
to a plot of land already described in the Torrens map.146 The transaction
is then reported to and certiﬁed by the relevant state authorities. Once
the transaction is certiﬁed, ownership according to the Torrens registration cannot be challenged, though persons wrongly deprived of ownership may have a claim against a dedicated state fund for errors in
Torrens registrations.147
The advantages of the Torrens system are clear when one compares
the difficulty of verifying title under the different registry systems. Under
the old recordation system, if Beatrice the purchaser wanted to verify
that Alice the seller had good title to Blackacre, Beatrice would have to
search for deeds in Alice’s chain of title. She would hunt for a deed
where Alice was the buyer, note the name of the seller, and then hunt for
the deed where that seller originally bought the property. Beatrice would
search from deed to deed until she had established a chain of title.
Beatrice would then follow the chain forward in time, and it would
hopefully lead back to Alice.148 Misﬁled deeds,149 “wild deeds,”150 and any
number of other phenomena might lead Beatrice to conclude that Alice
had good title, even though she did not.151 By contrast, under the
Torrens system, Beatrice’s examination is quick and easy. To transfer
Blackacre, Alice would have to hand over to Beatrice a certiﬁcate that
identiﬁes Blackacre and Alice as Blackacre’s owner. Beatrice need merely
go to the registry and check that the certiﬁcate is genuine—i.e., that
Alice really is the registered owner of Blackacre as described in the
certiﬁcate.152

145. Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing Countries, 13
Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 647, 651–52 (explaining how maps are integral to systems of land
registration).
146. D.H. Van Doren, Current Legislation, The Torrens System of Land Title
Registration, 17 Colum. L. Rev. 354, 355 (1917).
147. McCormack, supra note 141, at 81–83 (discussing various indemniﬁcation
methods provided under Torrens land registration system).
148. For a description of title searches under deed systems, see id. at 67–69.
149. See id. at 69 (“[R]ecorded, apparently valid transaction[s] may be void or defective.”); see also Barry Goldner, The Torrens System of Title Registration: A New Proposal
for Effective Implementation, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 661, 666–67 (1982) (listing common
causes of misﬁled deeds).
150. See Emily Bayer-Pacht, The Computerization of Land Records: How Advances in
Recording Systems Affect the Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of Title Doctrine, 32
Cardozo L. Rev. 337, 346–47 (2010) (describing wild deed doctrine).
151. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 667 (discussing difficulty of determining validity
of deed solely on basis of examination of record).
152. See William C. Niblack, Pivotal Points in the Torrens System, 24 Yale L.J. 274, 276
(“The declaration of the indefeasibility of the title as registered, of the conclusiveness of a
certiﬁcate of title, is absolutely essential to the working of the Torrens system.”).
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Thus, with the simple expedient of a central map, the Torrens system tightly aligns asset with information. Under the Torrens system, land
parcels are locked into a conﬁguration by a map, while registration information is keyed to the same map.
The Torrens system is even more valuable when combined with a
common reform that has generally accompanied Torrens registration systems. As noted earlier, land parcels are commonly circumscribed in one
of two systems. In the metes-and-bounds system, land parcels can be
irregular in shape, and they are circumscribed by features of the land
and measures described in a deed or other document.153 The rectangular
system, by contrast, describes land by coordinates on a common map.154
It should immediately be clear that many jurisdictions that adopted a
Torrens system of registration also found it advantageous to adopt a
rectangular system of parcelization.155 The same map can serve as the
basis of the rectangular parcelization and of the Torrens registration. To
be sure, not all regions with rectangular parcels use Torrens registration,
and not all Torrens jurisdictions feature rectangular parcels.156 Nonetheless, because Torrens systems and rectangular systems often go together,
Torrens jurisdictions can frequently beneﬁt from both advantageous asset conﬁgurations and from the tight alignment between asset and information.
Technology provides new and improved means of aligning land
assets with information about title. GPS technology, along with the proliferation of excellent maps available via the Internet, makes it possible for
nearly every buyer and seller to verify the precise boundaries of land parcels, even if the parcels are not rectangular. We can predict that as information technology improves, the ability to align the conﬁguration of
land parcels and information about property rights will only increase.
C.

Changing Roles

To this point, we have assumed a fairly benign picture of owner and
nonconsensual taker. These roles, however, may be more complicated.
There are times when the owner is not interested in protecting formal
title, but rather, is interested in possession only. Likewise, there are times
when the nonconsensual taker wants to protect the formal title, in order
to establish her own title.

153. Stephen V. Estopinal, A Guide to Understanding Land Surveys 93–94 (3d ed.
2009).
154. Id. at 103–05.
155. Hanstad, supra note 145, at 677–78 (explaining how Torrens system facilitates
Cadastral maps, which in turn make parcelization easier).
156. Id. at 670–71 (pointing out little of Torrens system ﬁnds applicability in United
States, which prefers land recordation or registration of deeds system). This is despite
widespread deployment of the Rectangular Survey method here.
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To see this, consider the example of an owner who ﬁnds himself in
debt and possibly subject to enforcement actions by a creditor. Until he
ran into trouble, the owner would have sought good title information in
order to protect his ownership interests in assets. However, under threat
of repossession, the owner will seek to hide assets from the creditor, and
therefore aim to obscure or destroy title information. The creditor’s
interests, too, are unlike those of the usual nonconsensual taker. She
seeks to use legal proceedings to acquire assets to repay the debt. The
closer the debtor moves to insolvency, the greater the creditor’s interest
in protecting formal title and information about that title. It is this
dynamic that drives much of the law of bankruptcy. This dynamic leads,
in its extremes, to a reversal of roles. The owner seeks to destroy the
interface between title information and asset, while the potential nonconsensual taker seeks to preserve it.
Insolvency is not the only circumstance in which this inversion of the
usual incentives can occur. Taxes, for instance, can place the state tax
collector in the role of nonconsensual taker who seeks good title information, with the owner, again, seeking to obscure that information.
III. WHEN THE STATE COMES MARCHING IN
Until now we have paid little attention to the distinct role of the
state as a regulator. In this Part, we introduce the role of the state and
examine how the state affects the strategies of the various players in the
game of information about property rights.
A.

The Two Roles of the State

We begin with the obvious: The state takes sides in the battle between owners and nonconsensual takers. The state generally aims not
only to raise the value of property rights, but also to ensure that the value
of such rights is enjoyed by the legal owners rather than nonconsensual
takers.157 This means that, in general, the state seeks to complement the
strategies owners take to defend the security of their rights. However, the
power of the state regarding registries is so great that it can help and
harm owners at the same time. To see this, return to our earlier observation that registries add value to property rights by facilitating transfers
among owners and voluntary takers, and by obstructing illicit deprivations
of title by involuntary takers. The state’s actions create countervailing
effects. By enhancing the power of registries, for instance, the state may
increase their facilitative value while reducing their obstructive value.
157. The state, of course, may have ulterior motives in its management of registries or
title information. The state may collect title information in order to make it easier to
collect taxes related to the asset or transactions in the asset. Alternatively, or additionally,
the state may gather and disseminate title information in order to serve other regulatory
goals. These motives are certainly important for a full analysis of registries, though they
are beyond the scope of our analysis.
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This surprising observation about the state’s powers stems from the
fact that property disputes must be resolved on the basis of imperfect
information. Often, multiple claimants to an asset can point to evidence
indicating they have ownership. For instance, Jack may claim ownership
of Blackacre on the basis of proven possession for many years, while Jill
claims ownership on the basis of a deed of sale from a known previous
owner. When the state resolves such cases by vindicating the ownership
claim of one of the claimants, it necessarily effaces the competing ownership claim of the other claimant. Any rule of evidence chosen by the state
facilitates ownership based on some kinds of evidence and therefore
necessarily privileges certain kinds of information by allowing it to trump
imperfect property claims.
Even without registries, the state can, and often does, use information about certain aspects of property as a route to perfect title and
defeat otherwise potentially valid claims of title. Doctrines of adverse
possession provide the most outstanding example. Adverse possession
grants perfect title to a property claimant who can prove uninterrupted
possession for the requisite period of time, notwithstanding the existence
of a competing “true” owner with better prior title.158
Similar doctrines are often associated with registries. For instance, in
some states (so-called “race states”), where the owner of Blackacre sells
the property to two buyers in succession, the state grants title to
Blackacre to the subsequent purchaser, even though the seller had
already given up title by the time of the sale, as long as the subsequent
buyer is the ﬁrst to record the sale in the registry.159
The result is that the state plays two roles when it maintains a
property registry. The ﬁrst and most obvious role of the state is that of
“service provider” of information about title. The state provides a single
registry service that almost always beneﬁts from economies of scale that
lower the cost of centralized registries run by a single provider.
Second, and more importantly, the state determines the legal consequences of registering and failing to register. The state does not need to
restrict its role in registration to simply recording information. The state
can step beyond a narrow role and assign legal consequence to registration. In race states, for instance, the state functionally adjusts property
title to ﬁt the information in the registry.160 Once complete, the regis-

158. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 190 (2d
ed. 2012) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Principles and Policies] (describing principle of
adverse possession).
159. See id. at 921–22 (explaining how race statutes work).
160. See id. at 918 (noting state registration results in constructive notice “as a matter
of law,” which can block good faith purchaser claims by subsequent transferees); Ray E.
Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording System, Prob. &
Prop., May–June 1989, at 27, 28 (explaining race states allow ﬁrst recorder to acquire
property title).
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tration of property rights can divest title from a prior holder and grant
title to the newly registered owner.161
In the literature, the two potential functions of the state—recorder
of rights, or arbiter of titles—are referred to as recordation and registration, respectively.162 In a recordation system, a land registry is limited
to recording information about who claims to own Blackacre.163 In the
registration system, the state potentially makes ownership of Blackacre
contingent on the information in the registry.164 A recording scheme
might place every deed concerning Blackacre in the registry without determining the legal consequence of those deeds.165 Even if potential
buyers of Blackacre conducted a thorough title search and purchased
title insurance, they would still have to face the possibility that a recording error might defeat their title.166 By contrast, if the state acted as a
“true” registrar, its record of title to Blackacre would be deﬁnitive.167
Once a buyer of Blackacre conﬁrmed that the seller was the registered
titleholder in the registry, the buyer could be certain of the seller’s ability
to transfer title. No private title insurance would be necessary.168
When the state acts as a registrar and rewrites property rights in
accordance with the information in registries, it lowers the cost of voluntary transactions by reducing the need to search for information. Yet, at
161. Merrill & Smith, Principles and Policies, supra note 158, at 918; Sweat, supra note
160, at 28 (observing race states will protect title of subsequent purchaser who is ﬁrst to
record even where subsequent purchaser is aware of earlier conveyance).
162. See, e.g., Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, The Choice of Titling System in
Land, 48 J.L. & Econ. 709, 710–12 (2005) (drawing distinction between recordation and
registration systems); Hanstad, supra note 145, at 670–71, 673–74 (same); Lueck & Miceli,
supra note 50, at 214–17 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (same).
163. See McCormack, supra note 141, at 68 (“[T]he acceptance of an instrument for
recordation does not usually reﬂect a governmental judgment that the instrument is
legally effective [because] the government is merely a depository of copies of the
instruments . . . .”).
164. Id. at 80 (pointing out statement of ownership contained in certiﬁcate is intended to function as “mirror” of true state of title).
165. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 667 (observing with respect to recording systems
“validity of a deed cannot be determined from a review of the record”); Hanstad, supra
note 145, at 670–71 (“The conventional recording system makes no averments . . . about
the state of the title to any parcel of land.”).
166. See Goldner, supra note 149, at 666–67 (describing “several ways in which a cloud
of uncertainty hangs over a recorded title”).
167. Hanstad, supra note 145, at 673 (“Under land title registration, a certiﬁcate of
title . . . provides conclusive evidence of the land rights pertaining to a particular land
parcel.”).
168. Goldner, supra note 149, at 669–70 (“Adopting a title registration system would
necessarily involve a major cutback, if not the complete dismantling, of the title assurance
industry.”). An important feature of U.S. versions of the Torrens system is that they have
offered alternative state insurance of the validity of titles certiﬁed through the Torrens
registration procedure. This state insurance has been costly and highly controversial. See
Powell, supra note 73, at 72–73 (surveying exhaustion of various state assurance funds used
to satisfy title-error claims).
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the same time, the deﬁnitive nature of a registry may make theft easier in
some cases. If Clarice can successfully counterfeit the information in the
registry to record herself as the “owner,” she can acquire a transferable
title to the property. In this sense, the registry inadvertently facilitates
theft and lowers the barrier to nonconsensual taking.
B.

The Optimal State Registry

The dual-edged nature of the state’s power allows us to show that the
state’s optimal approach can be boiled down to three simple rules.
First, states should view registries as most valuable when there is a
tight alignment between the description of the assets in a registry and
their actual conﬁguration in the real world. If the state can conﬁdently
predict that that alignment will be maintained—as is the case for instance in famous and valuable works of art—then registries have the
greatest facilitative and obstructive value.169 By contrast, if the good in
question is difficult to ﬁx in form and description—for instance, if it is a
nondescript crate of widgets—there is little point in a registry.170
Second, registries should only be empowered to rewrite property
rights when it is clear that the gains from clearing away potential competing invalid claims outweigh the losses entailed in eliminating potential valid claims. The balance between these gains and losses depends
upon the reliability of the information that can be expected in the registry. Reliable information facilitates transactions by the owner; less reliable
information may aid transactions of thieves and other takers. In other
words, the possibility of inaccurate information may lead to a situation
where the facilitative function of registries can clash with the obstructive
function. Even with imperfect information, the guarantees offered by
“true” registries will still assist owners in transacting and thereby produce
facilitative gains for society. However, if thieves can manipulate registries
with false information, the registry might work to “launder” takings and
grant good title to the successors of involuntary takers. Consequently, the
registry can produce a negative obstructive effect; it might actually help
rather than hinder thieves. The desirability of having legal rights conform to the registry, therefore, depends on a variety of factors, such as
the cost of independently verifying information, the credibility of information in the registry, the vulnerability of the registry to information
favoring nonvoluntary takers, and the size of the market for the asset
without the registry.
169. Professor Shavell describes registries as most useful when assets are durable and
valuable. Shavell, supra note 9, at 49–50.
170. Professors Jackson and Baird make the same point about grain in a silo. See Baird
& Jackson, Uncertainty and Transfer, supra note 57, at 306–07 (“[A] title-based recording
system is much harder to organize for grain in a silo . . . [because] [o]ne has no easy way
of knowing that this was the grain grown on Blackacre in one jurisdiction . . . [or that] . . .
the grain in the silo today was the grain that was there yesterday.”).
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Third, in considering what information to include in the registry—
or, indeed, whether to maintain a registry at all—the state must take into
account not only start-up costs, but also the tradeoff between comprehensiveness and accuracy. A registration system that only updates records
when it receives evidence ensuring a high degree of accuracy can guarantee that the information located within the registry can be relied upon.
At the same time, this demand for accuracy comes with a cost. Evidence
is not costless, and the more evidence the state registry demands, the
more owners must invest in proving their ownership. These costs will inevitably drive some properties out of the registration system. Owners will
examine the cost of producing the necessary evidence and weigh it
against the beneﬁts produced by registration, and they may ﬁnd that registration is simply not worth it. In some cases, moreover, registration may
not even be available, as the owner simply lacks the ability to provide the
evidence required by the registry. Conversely, a registry that relaxes evidentiary standards can encourage more registrations. With lower costs of
obtaining evidence, owners will ﬁnd it more worthwhile to register property rights. However, the lower evidentiary standards will almost certainly
lead to lower quality records. Poorer information will lead to less reliable
registries.
We now explain our reasoning behind each of these conclusions.
1. Aligning Title Information and Asset. — As we noted in Part II,
information about title to property is subject to a constant tug-of-war
between owners and potential involuntary takers. Takers have a variety of
methods for trying to hide the true title information about assets. Jewelry
can be disassembled and precious metals melted; cars can be “chopped”
and sold for parts. Land, on the other hand, is much more difficult to
mask and reconﬁgure. Takers will focus their efforts on assets that are
vulnerable in their alignment between description and actual physical
conﬁguration. The assets that are most amenable to registries are those
whose alignment is stable. If the state cannot be certain of the stability of
assets and information about them, a registry can be counterproductive.
One important implication is that assets cannot be treated uniformly
when it comes to registries. As Professor Shavell notes, in some cases
assets will simply not be valuable enough to warrant the cost of registries.171 But for highly unstable assets, our analysis shows that it will be
difficult to maintain a viable registry even though title information might
potentially be extremely valuable. This is easiest to see in the context of
intellectual property. Given the nature of intellectual property, it is often
difficult or impossible for owners to effectively imprint indicia of their
ownership on their assets. This undermines the ability of registries to tie
title information effectively to assets. The problem of online piracy is so
intractable precisely because it is difficult to mark assets in the digital
171. Shavell, supra note 9, at 50 (listing “radios, televisions, and similar items” as assets
not warranting registration).
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realm. Two distinct, yet connected, phenomena combine to produce this
result. The ﬁrst, and oft-discussed, is the ease with which new digital
copies can be produced.172 The second, which arises from our analysis, is
the inability of rightholders to mark their assets in a stable manner,
impervious to manipulation.
In the online realm, copyright notices can easily be removed or
effaced. Similarly, information about the owner may be deleted or altered.173 Once all ownership-relevant information is removed, nonconsensual users can forge ahead and reproduce the work without any telltale signs, giving unsuspecting third parties the impression that the work
is “unowned.” It is noteworthy that the actions taken by nonconsensual
takers simultaneously beneﬁt the takers and undermine the ability of
copyright owners to transact with willing third parties. In this highly compromised informational environment, willing transactors must bear two
costs as well. First, they often do not know the identity of the rightful
rightholder. Second, they must bear high veriﬁcation costs even in those
cases where the correct information appears, as there is always a risk that
information that appears on digital ﬁles is incorrect. It is therefore not
surprising that not only is online piracy rampant, vulnerable industries
have suffered measurable losses.
The state may attempt to combat instability with auxiliary legal protections. Once again, copyright provides an interesting example. One of
the provisions of the controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 was an effort to protect the integrity of copyright management
information (CMI).174 Under the act, CMI is information conveyed in
connection with copies or displays of copyrighted works concerning the

172. See, e.g., James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2007, 2013 (2000)
(describing information dissemination as “efficient” because “marginal cost of
information is zero”); Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 675, 698 (1993) (noting “zero marginal cost associated with additional
users” of information); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,
83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1053–54 (2005) (suggesting marginal cost in information industry is
“zero or close to it”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
106 Yale L.J. 283, 292 (1996) (“[A]s a general rule, once a work is produced, the marginal
cost of disseminating it to the public, whether in hard copy or electronically, approaches
zero.”); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 2083, 2116 (2009) (observing marginal cost of additional user of information is
zero); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood
Relation, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635, 645–46 (2007) (“Once the ﬁxed costs needed to create
the ﬁrst copy of a particular work have been incurred, any number of copies of the
original can be made without reducing the supply available for additional copies.”).
173. Russell W. Jacobs, Copyright Fraud in the Internet Age: Copyright Management
Information for Non-Digital Works Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 13
Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 97, 146–47 (2011) (describing legal reforms amidst concerns
of preserving authentic author attribution of digital works).
174. 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2012).
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copyright ownership and other relevant data regarding rights.175 The act
forbids potential infringers from falsifying, altering, or destroying CMI in
certain conditions.176 The aim of the provision is to create a stable alignment between title information and intellectual property assets, by deterring takers from attempting to destabilize the connection.177
Finally, the state must provide special rules for situations when parties’ incentives are expected to change. It may have to provide special
protections for the validity of title information when the owner is insolvent or expected to be insolvent. As we noted previously in section II.C,178
this is one of the central concerns of the laws of bankruptcy. Richard
Epstein also notes the importance of registries in allowing creditors to
give notice of their interests to third parties by registering security interests.179 While Epstein accurately describes the registry as protecting the
interests of strangers, it might more accurately be described as protecting
the interest of the creditor (here with the incentives of the owner) in preserving the integrity of information against the interest of the owner
(here with the incentives of the nonconsensual taker) in undermining
the integrity of that information.
2. Facilitating vs. Obstructing Transactions. — If and when the state
decides to adopt a registry for a certain class of properties, it must confront the question of what legal effect to give to the registries. For some
classes of property, the registry should be given the power to rewrite legal
rights; it should be a “true” determinative registry that sweeps away
inconsistent claims. But for other classes of property, collecting and presenting the information should suffice. Traditionally, the debate about
whether true registration is superior to recording has focused on the cost
of true registries.180 We argue that the efficacy of registration depends in
175. Id. § 1202(c)(3).
176. Id. § 1202(a)–(b).
177. It is vital to bear in mind that current intellectual property registries contain
information about title to the intellectual property, rather than to any particular physical
embodiment of it. For instance, a copyright registry will note that J.K. Rowling owns rights
to the copyright in the Harry Potter novels, but it will not register ownership of each of the
millions of printed copies of those books. The registry thus provides signiﬁcantly less shelter value for any given purchaser.
178. See supra section II.C (assessing incentives of debtors in bankruptcy context).
179. See Richard A. Epstein, Comment, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353, 1355–57 (1981) (“[W]here recordation of an interest is
properly ﬁled, it binds all subsequent takers [because] [a]ctual notice typically is provided
by, and properly may be inferred from, proper recordation.”). Epstein’s primary concern is
servitudes and the rights of parties with lesser property interests than title, rather than
security interests and creditors. However, the analysis is similar.
180. Compare Powell, supra note 73, at 40–53 (presenting comparison of costs of land
transactions with and without title registration), with McDougal & Brabner-Smith, supra
note 77, at 1138–43 (impugning on multiple grounds Powell’s comparison of relative costs
of registration and title insurance). See generally Arruñada, Property as Economic
Concept, supra note 44, at 121–25 (presenting expanded cost analysis of land transactions
and arguing for necessity of registry system).
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larger part on the anticipated facilitative and obstructive effects of the
registry.
As demonstrated earlier in Part I,181 registries can increase the value
of property rights not only by facilitating lawful transactions, but also by
obstructing illicit transactions. If registries do little more than transmit
information, these two effects will always go hand in hand. As it is easier
for owners to transact, it will be more difficult for involuntary takers to
transact. However, when registries do more than merely convey information—when they are “true” registries that sweep away claims that compete with the registered ownership—they can produce facilitating and
obstructive effects that work at cross-purposes. This is because “true” registries make it easier for buyers to rely on the registered state of title, no
matter whether that registered information is the result of a voluntary
and lawful transaction or if it resulted from an involuntary taking
coupled with a registry error. If an involuntary taker manages to fool the
registry into registering his title as good, a buyer may rely on his title over
that of a competing owner who acquired title lawfully but failed to
register her interest properly. When takers can beneﬁt from registries as
well, registries can facilitate rather than obstruct illicit transactions.
Obviously, the reliability and security of the information obtained by
the state is a central factor in identifying cases where the state’s giving
determinative power to registries can be counterproductive. If the state
can easily verify the verity of title information, it can reduce the likelihood of potential buyers being hoodwinked by involuntary takers. At the
same time, the facilitative power of determinative registries is greatest
when private buyers in the marketplace have a difficult time themselves
verifying title information. Thus, the state should choose to grant determinative power to registries when it has a clear advantage over private
actors in verifying information.182
3. Comprehensiveness vs. Accuracy. — A ﬁnal factor for the state to
consider, when it adopts a registry of whatever type, is what rules the state
must adopt specifying the kinds of information the registry will record
and present.
Consider a land sale. Should the registry present information about
sales that are in process, or should it record only completed transactions?
At what stage of payment or delivery of deed should the registry present
a land sale as complete and subject to registration? Should registries
present information about mortgages or liens? To what degree should
the registry demand proof of lack of encumbrances before recording a
transfer? Should, for instance, all the neighbors be required to certify a
lack of potential nuisance claims before a land transfer can be recorded?
181. See supra Part I (setting forth functions of property registries).
182. This same basic tradeoff appears in other contexts as well, such as the question of
the rights a bona ﬁde purchaser ought to acquire to goods purchased in the market with
defective title.
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Each of these procedural questions demands separate analysis, but
the central set of concerns presented by each is the same. Greater informational demands by the registry ensure better and more veriﬁable
information, and, hence, a registry that better facilitates voluntary transactions and foils involuntary ones. At the same time, greater informational demands increase the cost of using the registry, and thus threaten
to drive transactions partially or completely outside the registry system.
At the extreme, a registry can have such demanding rules that it never
errs in providing information, but has almost no registered properties
because almost no owners can comply with the informational demands.
An example can help illustrate the tradeoff. Consider a state with a
Torrens system of land registration with fairly demanding procedural
rules for demonstrating that a transaction has taken place. On the one
hand, this can create a high degree of conﬁdence in land sales that
involve the sale of fully registered rights. On the other hand, the system
will create a registry that under-records many transactions which do not
meet its demanding procedures. The result will be numerous transactions that are genuine, but which lack and may never acquire the necessary prerequisites for registration.
The right balance between accuracy and comprehensiveness is difficult to specify in the abstract. A high degree of accuracy may compensate
for the lack of comprehensiveness. In addition, transacting parties can
protect themselves by recording title information through other means.
For instance, land sales might be recorded by private entities pending
“official” recordation in the land registry.183 While such alternative recordations lack the determinative power of the official registry, they would
help transacting parties verify much of the title information that is lacking in the official registry.
CONCLUSION
Information is a crucial aspect of any property system. The information contained in registries can dramatically enhance the value of property rights in our society. Furthermore, registries often constitute the
most effective way to protect the rights of owners. Notwithstanding their
importance, registries are rarely discussed by property theorists. In this
Essay, we have sought to illuminate the dual role registries play in the
property world. Like the Roman god Janus, registries have two faces.
They simultaneously perform a facilitative role by streamlining transactions between willing sellers and buyers, and an obstructive role by hindering nonconsensual deprivations of assets. As this Essay shows, both

183. Robert E. Dordan, Comment, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS),
Its Recent Legal Battles, and the Chance for a Peaceful Existence, 12 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L.
177, 177–80 (2010) (discussing nuances of similar privatized system, MERS, in ﬁeld of
recordation of mortgages, and possible reforms to improve its notice functionality).
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effects should be taken into account by policymakers, who must ensure
that registries are optimally designed to perform both roles.
This Essay also demonstrates, contra conventional wisdom, that perfect information about assets may be welfare diminishing, as it may
prompt nonconsensual takers to destroy, dismember, and reconﬁgure
assets in order to make them unrecognizable and thereby drive a wedge
between the description of the asset in the registry and its state in the
real world. More generally, we have shown that the main goal of registries
should not be to offer perfect information about assets and rights, but
rather to ensure a stable ﬁt between the information in the registry and
the relevant asset covered.
This important insight enables the rethinking of the conditions under which registries would function optimally. In addressing this question, prior scholarship focused exclusively on the cost of collecting and
updating the data and the beneﬁts from the registry. Our analysis shows
that this view only captures the tip of the iceberg. It fails to take account
of the effect of registries on the primary behavior of property owners and
third parties and the various strategies they will adopt in the presence of
right registries. Applying these insights, this Essay lists the assets and
rights for which registries will function well and delineates the limits of
registries.
In a sense, registries are the dark matter of the property universe.
Their existence is vital to our understanding of the property system, but
we know precious little about them. In this Essay, we have sought to shed
light on the phenomenon of registries in order to advance our understanding of the operation of property systems and, in particular, the
informational environment that optimizes the workings of property law.

